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SYNOPSIS
This thesis seeks to explore some of. the main origins, strengths 
and weaknesses of regional development agencies both at a theoretical 
and practical level, and to examine how these conceptual issues have 
been translated within Britain where they have to take
account of social, political and administrative constraints.
Chapter one begins with a general discussion on the nature of 
the regional problem. The variety of types of government action at
the level of the region are discussed and their institutional 
requirements outlined. Out of this the regional development agency 
emerges as the central concern of the paper. In chapter two the 
origins of the development agency idea are explored by examining two 
of its earliest applications - the Tennessee Valley Authority and the 
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Several features emerge as common to both 
agencies. In the third chapter it is contended that the creation 
of 'ad hoc' regional development agencies represents an attempt to 
establish at the level of the region a new and more powerful form 
of planning i.e. 'innovative' planning. This demands that development 
agencies are created in a form which can avoid the inherent inflexibility 
and constraints of the traditional government bureaucracy.
In chapter four, the background to the creation of regional 
development agencies in Britain, and in particular Scotland, is 
discussed. Their emergence is seen in terms of an evolving regional 
planning machinery and a changing attitude towards regional affairs. 
Chapter five looks at the Highlands and Islands Development Board as 
the first large-scale application of the development agency idea in 
Britain. It is contended that much of its 'success', compared to 
previous attempts at development, can be attributed to its 
institutional form. Chapter six focusses attention on the 
Scottish Development Agency as one of the new generation of development 
agencies created by the Labour Government in 1975- Although 
relatively new its operations serve to illustrate many of the 
constraints and problems facing this type of institution.
The concluding chapter draws together some of the main 
problems inherent in the development agency concept and those 
problems particular to the way it has been applied in Britain.
It is proposed that there is a clear need to determine when it is 
an appropriate institutional solution and that more work is needed 
to improve the institutions of the future.
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INTRODUCTION
The decade from the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's was a period of 
intense government activity in the field of regional planning and 
development in Britain. The creation of the Regional Economic Planning 
Councils and Boards in 196^ marked the first real attempt at 
establishing a system of planning at the level of the region by 
creating a permanent institutional arrangement.
Similarly, new and stronger interventionist legislation 
covering regional assistance for industry were introduced. However, 
it was not until the creation of the Highlands and Islands Development 
Board in 1965? and the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies in 1975? 
that regional planning became a legitimate and powerful activity within 
British planning practice.
The creation of these fad hoc' regional development agencies 
represented a radical attempt by central government to create a new 
system of administration at the region in order to confront the severe 
and complex problems of regional decline. Apart from anything else 
this suggested a philosophical basis for policies and institutions 
regional development different from that governing other 
innovations in regional matters. The notion of the region as 
a platform for the implementation of policies on behalf of central 
government had given way to an acceptance of the region as an autonomous 
unit of development.
Given the considerable importance of these
innovations in terms of their power base for .decision and action at
H is  suprising
the region relative to previous efforts^ that so little attention has 
been paid to either the theoretical issues which relate to their 
creation or to their experience in practice. Given this neglect, 
the aim of this study is to explore some of the main origins, strengths 
and weaknesses of the development agency concept both at a theoretical 
and practical level, and to examine how these conceputal issues have been 
translated into practice where they have to take account of the social, 
political and administrative environment and constraints.
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The structure of the study divides • into two parts.
The first is an attempt to set out some of the main conceptual 
issues and ideas as they relate to the development agency as an 
instrument of regional planning and as a form of regional institution. 
Chapter 1 provides by means of an introduction to the subject area some 
of the background to a concern for the region on the part of government, 
and identifies the variety of forms regional action and regional 
institutions may take. Out of this the regional development agency 
emerges as the central concern of the study. Chapter 2 looks at 
the origins of the regional development agency concept by examining 
two early examples in practice, and attempts to identify some of the 
main features which have been seen as fundamental to subsequent 
applications of the idea. In Chapter 3 some of the main theoretical 
issues underlying the development agency concept are explored - in 
particular the notion that their creation represents an attempt to 
initiate a new and more powerful style of planning in order to overcome 
the limitations and inherent weakness of the traditional government 
administration.
In the second section the development agency concept, as it has 
emerged and been applied in Britain,is examined in relation to some of 
the arguments and issues raised in the earlier chapters. In Chapter 4 
the emergence of the development agency is seen in tccmS of an 
evolving regional planning machinery in Britain and a changing attitude 
towards regional issues. In Chapters 3 and 6 the case studies - the 
Highlands and Islands Development Board and the Scottish Development 
Agency - are examined in some detail as two prominent examples
of the development agency concept and its application in Britain. First, 
the background to their creation and what they were set up to do is 
examined. Second, their formal development is explored. Finally, their 
performance as regional development agencies is examined and explained 
according to the features outlined in the first section. The final 
Chapter concludes on the significance of the development agency as an 
institution of regional planning, and on the success of translating theory 
into practice.
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CHAPTER 1
REGIONAL INTERVENTION AND THE REGIONAL PROBLEM
1.1 The Regional Problem
Differences across national economic space,whether measured in 
terms of unemployment, income, migration rates, standard of living 
or 'welfare1, have presented themselves as an inevitable consequence 
of economic progress. This is by no means a new phenomenon.
Spatial disparities have been traced back as far as the thirteenth 
century to Venice —  an early example of the core-periphery model 
(Baron, 1973)- However, it was not until the advent of the 
Industrial Revolution at the end of the eighteenth centry, which 
fundamentally altered the economic structure of the more advanced 
countries, that significant spatial differences became apparent.
These differences have stemmed in the most part from either 
the absence of any industrial base, often as a result of poor natural 
resources, or the loss of some earlier locational advantage. An 
additional factor, of particular relevance to the experience in 
Britain, has been industrial stagnation i.e. the early start 
hypothesis. No matter the historical cause, regional disparities 
are usually associated with conditions of poor housing and education, 
relatively high unemployment and other disadvantages which make for 
hardship if not political unrest. This may in turn lead to emigration, 
from which a bias then develops in the population structure towards the 
less employable groups. Thus, the process of regional decline 
becomes cumulative.
In view of the long standing nature of these problems it is 
perhaps surprising to note that a concern for the region^ is only a 
relatively recent phenomenon. It was not really until after the Second 
World War, when government responsibility and- power to .control the level 
of activity came to be properly accepted, that the region became a
^Throughout this paper the region is taken to refer to any space greater 
than an urban area i.e. supra-urban, and smaller than a nation.
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major consideration of economic policy making. In particular, 
the acceptance of full employment as an objective, and of the goals 
of a welfare state, necessitated regional action (McCrone, 1976).
Although the need for action at the region on the part of 
government,regardless of political complexion, appears today to be 
universally accepted there remains some level of disagreement in 
practice as to the extent and form this involvement should take. 
Nevertheless, the general arguments in favour of intervention have 
always tended to centre on two main sets of issues, those of 'equity1 
and 'efficiency1.
The essence of the equity argument is that it is socially, 
morally, and thereby politically unacceptable for various parts of 
a nation to differ markedly in their levels of 'welfare'. On the 
other hand the efficiency argument has tended to emphasise the inadequate 
functioning of the regionally adaptive mechanisms resulting in the loss 
of potential growth through resources in certain areas remaining unused 
or underutilised (Vanhove and Klaassen, 1980). These arguments have 
important implications for the objectives, the policies and the 
instruments of regional intervention adopted by governments.
Throughout the remainder of this paper it is assumed that there 
is no dispute over the case for intervention. The argument concerns 
not the principle, but the way such action is formalised at the region.
1.2 Types of Regional Action
As we have seen, the introduction of a spatial element into the 
national decision-making machinery has been founded on two sets of 
objectives, to reduce the social hardship from unemployment (equity), 
and from a realisation that the achievement of national economic goals 
such as maximum economic growth and full employment could not be 
adequately accomplished through national planning alone (efficiency).
In Britain where "in principle, all power resides with the central 
government and sub-national bodies act only with devolved authority” 
(Gaskin, 197^ +, P* 203), this has meant that regional problems have 
been approached from an essentially centralist perspective i.e.
k
"national planning done by regions" (Grieve, 1980, p. 63)* Within 
this,policies designed to change the course of events in the regions 
have been given an especially, though not exclusively, economic 
formulation. This activity, which for present purposes is referred 
to as regional policy, provides the framework within which all other 
authorities at regional or sub-national levels must operate.
However, the inability of regional policy so defined to come to grips
with the sensitive and complex problems of particular regions has
led to increasing demands for alternative forms of regional action. 
The thesis advanced is that the regions themselves - the subject of
regional policy - should have a greater say in the form policy should
take and its impact upon them. Eegionalist issues require that 
some form of action is generated at the region itself. Peter Hall 
(1970) makes this point clear in discussing the relationship between 
central and local planning, where he states:
"You could theoretically create regional provincial 
governments which were responsible for drawing up 
structure plans, that is regional-local planning,
which could then be carried out in more detail by
the lower tier authorities; but these provinces
could simultaneously, I think, do quite a lot of
regional economic planning themselves."
(Hall, 1970, p. 81)
Clearly, what Hall is referring to here is not regional policy, but 
regional planning which points the way towards greater levels of 
regional autonomy, under a reformed structure of authority. This
freedom of action leads regional planning into a concern for
"The planning of the distribution of resources within 
a region of whatever resources (national or local) 
it has available to it, in pursuance of the regions 
own priorities for the satisfaction of its social 
needs, and the expression of policies directed to 
that end in a preferred pattern of economic and 
physical development."
(Senior, 1974, p. 450)
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On the basis of this formulation regional planning is seen as a 
framework for the steering and management of change between the 
central and local political administrations (Gillingwater, 1975)•
It is a process embracing a wide set of activities and which 
invariably includes a central concern for regional development, 
that is action designed to expand or change the economic structure 
of the area (Gaskin, 197*0.
The relationships between the various types of action 
outlined can pose major problems of articulation between the 
various levels of administration. The objectives of planning 
in any one region, and the resources to be allocated to achieve 
them, cannot be determined in isolation from what is happening in 
other regions or from the pursuit of broader objectives. These issues 
are of particular importance when new and powerful institutions of 
planning are created at the level of the region.
1.3 Types of Regional Institution
Central to the previous discussion was a concern for the 
institutional context of planning. The demands of
regional planning and regional development are such that they cannot 
be managed from London, Paris or Rome. Pressman and 
Wildavsky (1973) have shown in their study of implementation
"how great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland".
Therefore, if these actions are to have any real meaning it follows 
that some form of public instituions at the region are necessary to 
generate these actions and sustain the decision-making process they 
imply (Alden and Morgan, 197*0- From this a number of public 
governmental and administrative institutions have been proposed and 
tried. However, the popular view in practice is that those arrangements 
which have become established at the region have been weak and 
subservient to the central authorities. On this theme Kuklinski has 
argued:
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"If we try to find a common feature in the agencies 
responsible for regional planning in various countries, 
then behind the impressive display of differences in 
social and political backgrounds, in managerial 
solutions and in technical perfections, we would 
find one basic oommon feature, the regional planning 
agency, as a rule, has only an advisory capacity 
in the process of investment decisions.”
(Kuklinski, 1970, p. 27*0
The weaknesses implied in this statement, although echoed in the 
writings of many commentators, are not universal and by no means 
inevitable. There exists both in theory and practice a wide variety 
of institutional alternatives which are capable of organising 
themselves on a regional scale. Out of this two broad categories 
of institution have emerged:
i) those developed or evolved locally; and
ii) those established by and owing allegience to
central government as either advisory or 
executive.
In Britain those institutions which have developed locally have 
usually resulted from the coming together of neighbouring local 
authorities. The most common form of this type of institution is 
the industrial development association, for example, the North East 
Scotland Development Authority (NESDA). However, some of these 
organisations such as the North of England Development Council (NEDC) 
were initiated not by local authorities>but by private enterprise. 
Although their operations have met with some modest success it is an 
institutional form which has been little developed in practice, and one 
which is usually weak.
It is in the second of these categories that the most important 
developments have taken place. Alden and Morgan (197*0 for example 
identify four main institutional formulas available to central
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government in the British context, these are:
i) Administrative decentralisation by central 
government;
ii) Administrative devolution from central 
government;
iii) Regional or provincial government;
iv) Ad hoc regional institution created by 
central government.
Out of the wide variety of institutional arrangements conceivable 
those which have ‘ become established have denied the
region any real likelihood of matching up to the executive power and 
scope of government at the national and local level. As McCrone writes:
1fRegional planning cannot be said to have had much 
impact on the regional problem so far and in many 
respects it has still to find its role. Much 
depends on whether the regional bodies are to remain 
advisory or be given some executive powers."
(McCrone, 1976, p. 276)
However, out of this condition of institutional impotency the 
creation by central government of ad hoc regional development agencies 
to embrace new sets of problems, and to provide a strategic element 
in the development of the region, presents a potentially far more 
powerful base for decision-making and action at the region (Alden and 
Morgan, 197*0- Examples of this in Britain . have included
the setting up of the Highlands and Islands Development Board in 1965 
and the Scottish Development Agency in 1975- Their creation in
the form of semi-autonomous and executive agencies of government represents 
an attempt to translate into Britain many of the fundamental features of 
the development agency concept which have derived from the early regional 
development schemes in the Tennessee River Valley and the Mezzogiorno in 
Southern Italy.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT
MA nation attempting to develop its own backward
regions should ....  provide certain 'equivalents
of sovereignty1 for these regions. The most important 
of such equivalents is a reaction against the feelings
of despondency and self denigration ....  and the
mobilisation of its energies through regional 
institutions and programmes."
(A Hirschmann, 1963? P- 199)
2.1 Introduction
As an instrument of regional planning the regional development agency 
has only been resorted to when the problems have been perceived as 
particularly severe. The first, and perhaps best known example of this, 
was the creation in 1933 of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the 
United States. This represented the first large scale application of 
many of the ideas of regional planning - in particular the definition of 
the region on the basis of its problems. The creation in 1930 of the 
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno in Italy marked another important period in the 
heritage of the development agency idea and in the practice of regional 
planning.
Both these 'ad hoc' arrangements emerged as a pragmatic
response to the problems of regional decline. Yet many of their 
fundamental features have been seen as essential subsequent regional 
development programmes within a variety of contexts including Britain.
It is appropriate, therefore, to outline the main features and briefly 
examine the experience of both agencies in practice in an attempt to 
identify some of the strengths and weaknesses of the development agency 
approach.
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2.2 The Tennessee Valley Authority
The Need for Planning
The problems of the Tennessee Valley region"*- - a backward rural area 
extending within the boundary of seven states - were deep rooted, and seen 
as particularly severe within the context of an already industrialised and 
technoligically advanced national economy (Friedmann, 1973 b). Within 
the region what few private developments there were had taken place in a 
largely incomplete, piecemeal and uncoordinated fashion. It was becoming 
clear to government by the 1930’s (after an uphill battle
extending over many years prior to this - see Lilienthal, 1953)? that 
the people themselves were too dispirited to lift themselves out of their 
poverty unassisted. This realisation that the free play of market 
forces provided no solution to the difficulties of the South (at least 
that was the current belief) meant there was a need to look towards a 
new and radical approach to development. It was through President 
Roosevelts New Deal of 1933 (which created the TVA) that the political 
impetus for such an approach was provided.
The Government had prior to the TVA already “intervened” in the 
Tennessee River area through the siting of a Nitrate Plant at Muscle 
Shoals. And there was nothing particularly novel about the government 
becoming involved in individual public tasks. There were, for example, 
long established American precedents for government activity in flood 
control and navigation, in forestry and agriculture, and in research. 
Similarly, public power systems were by no means innovative (Lilienthal, 
1933)* What was radical and new about the whole TVA idea was that one 
agency was to be entrusted with responsibility for them all, and that no 
one activity was to be seen as an end in itself.
As the basis for this ’’unified development" approach, the 
regionalism of the South explicitly rejected . the conventional
unit of planning, i.e. the metropolitan area (Friedmann and Weaver, 1979)- 
Instead the concept of the homogenous natural area of the river basin 
presented itself as that most suited to a programme of comprehensive 
development (see Mackaye, 1928).
"^Defined as the Tennessee River Basin.
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This use of the region as an autonomous unit of development was 
to be a deliberate experiment by government to integrate goals of 
national advancement with those of regional welfare (Lilienthal, 1953)- 
In these terms the TVA - as a national agency but one confined to a 
particular region - was to become a means of strengthening rather than 
dividing the nation.
Meanwhile those in the South saw in regional planning, and its 
embodiement in the TVA proposals, an opportunity to halt the decline of 
their resources and people and to achieve a "regional balance" while 
maintaining a distinctive regional character (Friedmann and Weaver, 1979)•
The subsequent organisation of the TVA programme was to be an expression 
of many of these regionalism ideals.
The TVA and Regional Planning
The creation of the TVA in the form of an autonomous regional agency 
marked an important attempt to decentralise the functioning of the federal 
government and create an administrative device between the layers of state 
and national government. It was argued that an administration which was 
able to override existing political and economic boundaries and follow the 
technical relationships within the region would, as it were, fill an 
"institutional gap" between the layers of government and . be
better able to , confront certain sets of problems (Goodman, 19^ +7)•
In a communication to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Listor 
Hill, who in 1933 as a Representative was one of the conference managers 
for the original (TVA) Bill, spelled out in greater detail some of the 
thinking behind the TVA's organisation:
"The intent of the whole (TVA) statute was to create an 
agency which would be free of some of government red tape 
about which we complain, which would have authority 
commensurate with its responsibilites. We made certain 
that it could not 'pass the buck1 to another bureau or 
department in the event of failure and that it would not 
be required to waste time and energy in jurisdictional 
disputes. It was intended that the (TVA) Board alone be 
held responsible for the effective administration of the 
policies laid down by Congress?"
(Cited in Lilienthal, 1933? P» 170)
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It was hoped that by devising such an administrative arrangement 
which would see planning and action not as separate,but as a single and 
continuous process, to createwfHn/\ the Tennessee area a "spirit of 
enterprise". In order to achieve this the new authority would . 
require significant new powers and a great number of purposes toK»ch.’ - would 
inevitably raise many important administrative, economic and political issues. 
For example the Republicans/were fierce critics of the whole TVA proposals , 
seeing them as unnecessary, expensive and plainly unconstitutional 
(Patterson, 1976), were determined to show it would be a failure.
.. In order to initiate the TVA statute under the restricted 
powers of the federal government (set out in the Constitution), it was 
found necessary to argue the case for a TVA in terms of it removing barriers 
to inter-state commerce; only in this way could the TVA become a 
legitimate activity. Inevitably, therefore, it was around the technical 
problems of flood control and river navigation which provided the TVA's 
mandate that all other activities for regional planning must grow.
From the works constructed for these purposes, for example the building of 
dams, it was possible to produce and sell electric power and engage in the 
production of fertilizer. Though indirectly derived such schemes offered 
substantial development potential for the region.
Through the Act, therefore, the principle functions of the TVA 
emerged as:
i) Flood control;
ii) Improved navigation;
iii) Generation of electric power;
iv) The proper use of marginal lands;
v) Re-afforestation; and
vi) Securing the economic and social well-being of
the regions' population.
It is important to note that the majority of these purposes assigned 
to the TVA were, with the exception of vi), fairly specific and on-going 
in nature. As a result, much of its energies in practice became confined 
to carrying out set duties regardless of their impact on economic growth 
or overall regional welfare. The scheme developed increasingly
towards a technical exercise whose success became measured by electricity
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output, acres re-afforested, and volume of river traffic etc., rather 
than as an exercise in comprehensive regional resource development as 
originally envisaged.
This 'technical1 trend became ' . reinforced by the terms of
accountability (see Chapter Three) of the TVA programme,through the 
submission of annual reports for approval to Congress, but more particularly 
through its need to produce quick and 1 visible ■' results. Xn order
to retain support for its activities the TVA had to prove itself a success. 
As Lilienthal (1953> P* 183) notes:
"There are few enterprises ....  which have been subjected to
more rigerous and persistent public review or about which 
more detailed reports have been made".
Under such scrutiny it was hardly surprising that the TVA's potential 
for developing new and innovative programmes for development, which may 
take time to show results, or may even fail, was severely constrained.
This meant there was little need for long range planning by the Board. A s 
a result what planning there was took place in an informal way (Friedmann, 
1973 b) and remained largely in the hands of the states and the private 
institutions.
Yet despite the failure of the TVA scheme to live up to the ideals 
of those who favoured an integrated regional approach to resource 
development, it did retain some important vestiges of "regional thinking".
In particular, it outlined the importance of the public administration 
of regional planning by showing that:
"If a particular goal is described specifically, the method 
for reaching it should be disclosed with equal particularity; 
it cannot be ignored as an 'administrative detail' ".
(Lilienthal, 1953)
In these terms the essential features of the TVA have emerged as:
i) It was an autonomous body with its own controlling Board, 
separate from the federal (central) government and from 
the state (local) governments, with authority to make 
administrative decisions within the region.
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ii) It was accountable to the political executive 
(i.e. the President) rather than come under the 
auspices of ordinary government departments.
iii) It was given responsibility to deal with resources 
as a unified whole (if necessary transcending 
state boundaries) - not divided among several 
centralised federal departments with their 
headquarters in Washington.
iv) Through its sale of electricity and fertilizer 
the TVA had a substantial revenue of its own and 
was, therefore, less reliant on central government 
for its finance. This enabled the Board to take a 
longer term view of projects than would otherwise 
be possible through normal government budgeting.
The effect of these features on subsequent planning practice, 
particularly at the level of the region, have been profound. A s
an administrative device the regional development agency 'model1 (based 
on the ideas embodied in the TVA scheme) has served asthebasis for 
developments in Italy (the Cassaper il Mezzogiorno), Britain (the 
Highlands and Islands Development Board and the Scottish Development Agency - 
see Chapters 5 and 6) and in many other developed and developing countries.
2.3 The Cassa per il Mezzogiorno
The Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (Cassa), established
some time after the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1950* provides another 
prominent example of the development agency idea in practice. Its creation 
marked for the first time in Western Europe, intervention at the region 
beyond the use of licensing and investment incentives to firms (Allen and 
Maclennan, 1970)*
Whilst drawing on the same fundamental principles as the TVA the 
Cassa does, however, exhibit significant differences which have served to 
shape subsequent applications of the development agency idea - particularly 
in Britain.
1A
The Regional Problem and the Cassa
It was not really until the creation of the Cassa in 1950 that 
the North-South dualism in Italy began to attract official attention 
(Allen and Maclellan, 1970). There was an increasing realisation that 
the lack of coordination and planning, which had characterised previous 
attempts at Southern development, had . exaggerated rather than
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reduced regional differences. The continuing decline of the Mezzogiorno 
with high rates of out-migration, low income per head levels and low 
activity rates, lack of services and infrastructure - left the area 
displaying characteristics more akin to an underdeveloped country than 
of a region within one of the most industrialised western nations. This 
realisation meant that "The Southern Question" was no longer viewed in 
purely political or ideological terms, but was seen empirically as a 
seriously depressed area (for 'a fuller discussion of the problems of 
Southern Italy see Allen and Stevenson, 197^ -) •
The basic idea behind the creation of the Cassa, as a special 
development agency, was that it should complement the normal infrastructure 
activities of the state (i.e. the central, regional, provincial and local 
authorities) by undertaking coordinated "extraordinary interventions" 
wherever the standard state apparatus was shown to be inadequate either 
in scope or resources (Yuill, Allen and Hull, 1980). In essencej the 
Cassa was authorised to combine in its planning activities that whklrv would 
ordinarilly have concerned a variety of vertically oriented agencies of 
the national bureocracy. Through the Cassa the coordination of activities 
in the South would, it was hoped, prove possible.
The creation of the Cassa, therefore, was an ambitious exercise, 
representing on paper at least, "the beginnings of regional planning in 
Italy" (Allen and Maclennan, 1970, p. **7). In order to operate 
effectively it was accorded considerable financial flexibility and a 
substantial allocation of funds. Therefore, it was assumed in theory 
that the Cassa1s interventions would not be a substitute for what the 
ordinary administration might do, but provide "additional" intervention 
and a kind of programming based on administrative coordination (La Palombara, 
1966).
2
An area roughly corresponding to mainland Italy south of Rome plus Sicily, 
Sardinia and a number of smaller islands.
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The Cassa in Practice
However, from the very beginning there was some confusion as to 
the exact mission the Cassa was to fulfil* Over the years this 
continuing confusion has led some critics to point out that the ministries 
involved in Southern development tended to use the Cassa simply as either 
a "top-up" for their own activities, or as a dumping ground for problems 
they themselves could not resolve.
As Wi'Hrv the TVA, many of the problems confronting the Cassa 
were of an essentially technical nature. Up to 1957? therefore, the lar­
gest part of its effort was concerned with agricultural rehabilitation 
(agriculture being the Mezzogiorno's principle activity), and to a lesser 
extent infrastructure. Thus, the job of the Cassa, as a development 
agency for the South, was to promote increased agricultural production 
(mainly through land reform), and construct roads and schools etc.
These were seen basically as pre-industrialisation measures and were never 
really aimed at bringing about autonomous development in the South. Any 
upswing, therefore, in industrial development during the first ten years, 
as a result of these-improvements, would have to be regarded as a bonus 
rather than a policy expectation (Watson, 1970).
After 1997 a more direct strategy for industrialisation emerged.
As part of this move the Cassa was given a number of new functions, in 
particular the supplying of direct infrastructure for industry, where 
previously it had been concerned only with more general infrastructure 
projects (Yuill, Allen and Hull, 1980).
This new direction for policy presented serious problems for the 
Cassa's decision makers. It was not found easy, for example, to 
implement the current orthodoxy of the growth-centre strategy which 
created conflict in terms of economic benefit and spatial 
equality. As a result, the Cassa tried to steer a middle
course, being in some cases compelled to direct investments to areas whose 
sole claim to intervention lay in their political support and influence 
on the Cassa.
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, Respite the hopes that the creation of the Cassa would 
mark a break from the traditional problems of public administration 
(see Chapter 3) by having "operational freedom" (through "earmarked" 
funds and no sectoral constraints) it proved in practice to have its 
operations determined as much by the ballot box and local political 
interests as by economic rationality (La Palombara, 1966). In so far 
as this was the case, the Cassa's potential as a development agency, 
whose very strength lies in its freedom of action, was seriously 
curtailed.
2.k Reiteration : The Main Features
The complexity and scale of the problems of the Tennessee Valley 
and the Mezzogiorno, both suggested the need for new institutional 
arrangements at the region. In the case of the TVA it was the 
hydrological basin which provided the appropriate scale of operation.
In the Mezzogiorno the scale of operation was not so easy to determine, 
consequently the Cassa emerged as a spatially indiscriminate
organisation. This partly reflected a shift in regional planning 
itself away from the primary resource planning of the TVA towards multi- 
objective programmes concerned with loosely defined and messy problems - 
"southern development" - ccndi sets of ill-defihed and inter-related 
objectives - "to promote and accelerate development".
Yet both schemes showed that regional institutions, if they were 
to allocate values and resources effectively, would require the adoption 
of several essential ideas - a nomenclature "regional authority1’ would 
not necessarily constitute regional planning. These included:
i) The organisation should operate at the strategic 
level of the region;
ii) It should be endowed with broad executive powers;
iii) The organisation should be granted sufficient, 
and guaranteed finance to engage in new projects, 
and adopt a longer term view of planning. It 
may also be useful for the agency to generate 
finance of its own (n.b. TVA's sale of electricity 
and fertilizer).
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iv) These powers should be concentrated within a
single institution at the region with sufficient 
"autonomy" (see Chapter 3) to be capable of 
overcoming the many limitations inherent in 
traditional Government bureucracy.
These "fundamentals" of the development agency idea can be seen as 
an attempt to initiate a new style of planning at the region.
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CHAPTER 3
DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES : SOKE THEORETICAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
3*1 Introduction
Following on from the previous discussion of the origins of 
development agencies in practice, this chapter seeks to explore some of 
the main theoretical ideas and arguments which permeate the development 
agency concept. In particular, the emphasis will be on the administrative 
components of development agencies*where it is contended that their 
creation represents^ somewhere along the line, a translation from a 
theoretical base (or loosely articulated set of ideas) into an 
institutionalised form of interventionist activity.
It is hoped that by examining this somewhat neglected, yet 
fundamentally important, aspect of regional planning to provide a basis
for a better understanding of development agencies in practice.
3«2 Piiblic Planning and the Region
Regional planning as an activity which has been implanted and
developed at a particular level in society and within a particular 
environment, represents only one strand within a complex process of 
public planning (Gillingwater, 1973)- It is by definition sub-national, 
being subject to some degree of control, however powerful the regional 
authority, by a superior decision making body in its environment.
Similarly by definition regional planning is supra-urban, that is it often 
deals with a lower tier form of government which ”is near universally well 
established and well entrenched, which exercises important functions and 
which is often seen as the bulwark of democracy." (Alden and Morgan, 197^? 
p. 201)• Regional planning may thus have to work through and with these 
institutions and this may in turn influence planning methods adopted at 
the regional level.
Regional planning, therefore, whether considered administratively, 
politically or methodologically cannot be seen as either an exclusively 
technical exercise or a free-standing and autonomous administrative 
machine. As Gillingwater (1975) points out, it is not and cannot be 
considered an ’end' in and of itself? rather it is a 'means' concerned
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with the influence and manipulation of power and political influence 
within and between central and local administration. It is this 
institutional element which appears to be the most critical in shaping 
the regional planning process and yet remains the least explored.
Given this complex balance between the ’technical1 and political 
strands of regional planning, which in both Britain and North America 
have become increasingly intertwined and mutually dependant, it is 
hardly surprising to find that no ideal policy solution towards planning 
at the region exists. As the OECD Report (1973) states:
"Since each country has its own political structure, 
its own system of administration and its own 
peculiar sets of problems, it is unlikely that there 
would be any kind of uniformity in the forms of 
organisation which exist to deal with any of the 
major problems. This is as true in the field of 
regional policies as of any other."
(OECD, 1973, P. 213)
This presents for the planner a fundamental problem \t in a 
given situation which type of institution and which procedure will serve 
the end of planning best? (Faludi, 1973 a).
3-3 Regional Planning Style : Allocative and Innovative Planning
In the theoretical literature much has been written about the variety 
of planning 'styles' and their implications for the process of planning.
Out of this extensive debate two broad dimensions of planning have 
presented themselves as having most significance at the level of the 
region i.e. "allocative" and "innovative" planning - both distinct forms 
in terms of their potential for action and in their institutional 
requirements (Friedmann, 1966). By examining their distinctive features 
it may be possible to translate elements of both planning styles into 
more general arguments concerning the public administration of regional 
planning.
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"Allocative" Planning
Much of the debate concerning the form of planning at the region 
revolves around the notion of autonomy i.e. the ability of
institutions at the region to formalise and implement policies and
programmes of their own. Under a system of allocative planning, where
the main concern is to ensure the coordination and optimal allocation of
resources between all competing uses with a view to maintaining the 
system in balance (Friedmann, 1976)» power and responsibility are vested 
with the central authorities. This ’top-down1
(i.e. national/regional (P Hall, 1975)) cate gorisation of planning means-flr\0cV
the region becomes simply a platform whereby functions are discharged
and policies are physically implemented. This is reflected in the weak
institutional arrangements responsible for regional planning, such as
decentralised or devolved central departments or advisory bodies (see
Chapter *f). Regional planning, therefore, is seen as a bureaucratic
activity concerned solely with the articulation and coordination of'tVx
’means' necessary to achieve nationally (i.e. centrally) determined ends, 
with
rather than/innovatory change.
Within allocative planning, therefore, the key priority becomes 
the contextual elements of public planning itself i.e. the stability 
within the administration of planning, between those institutions and 
individuals which are the subject of this intervention, and society at 
large (Gillingwater, 1975)* essence.allocative planning assumes a
given order and is not concerned with changing that order unless directed 
to do so by those with legitimately regarded authority.
"Innovative" Planning
In purely conceptual terms innovative and allocative planning can 
be seen as opposite ends of a complete autonomy - dependancy continuum 
the position along which will determine to what degree planning 
institutions are able to independently pursue their own policies, or 
be entirely dependant on the actions of others. In practice, where most 
decisions fall somewhere between these two extremes, this crucial question 
of administrative articulation poses a major challenge to policy-makers.
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In innovative planning it is the high degree of autonomy afforded 
the regional institution in the setting of 'ends* and 1 means 1 which is 
the crucial distinguishing feature. Therefore, because access to 
power becomes a feature internal to the regional planning process itself 
it is a style of planning which has only been resorted to in times of 
crisis or when alternative approaches have failed. . its
significance in practice must not be understated.
The creation of ad hoc regional development agencies, such as the 
Highlands and Islands Development Board and the Scottish Development 
Agency, represent important attempts to initiative a kind of "innovative" 
regional planning through their ability to:
"Fuse plan making with plan implementing ....  the
essential feature being neither plans nor intentions 
for other agencies to act upon but action which changes 
the nature of reality."
(Friedmann, 1973? P- 39)
These new institutions illustrate the attractions of innovative 
planning in terms of its ability to come to grips with serious problems 
and conditions of crisis at the region (Alden and Morgan, 197^)•
As Hambleton (1979) notes, by re-defining planning in this way 
implementation is no longer seen as a step subsequent to policy 
formulation (as in allocative planning),but becomes part of a complex 
chain of reciprocal action. This process of a continual learning from 
experience through policy formulation, implementation and feedback is 
essential if institutions are to constantly evolve in the face of 
changing circumstances and thereby bridge the gap between intent and 
action.
0/] the basis of this formulation innovative 
planning represents an explicitly political activity. Within this 
political environment of regional planning the role of the regional 
planner becomes one which attempts to harness and mobilise the largest
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share of resources and commitment to a single new or neglected 
use with a view to producing major changes, or a realignment of 
existing objectives (Friedmann, 1966)j even where this might have 
severe implications for competing uses and the achievement' of other 
values elsewhere (Alden and Morgan, 197^)- To this extent innovative 
planning becomes analogous to advocacy planning (see Davidoff, 1965), 
where the innovative institution assumes the role of advocate for the 
region.
3.^  The Institutional Context of Planning
Having outlined the main components of both the allocative and 
innovative dimensions of regional planning in theoretical terms, it is 
now possible to make some general observations concerning their 
institutional and operational requirements within the British context.
In Britain where the style of government, and therefore the 
administrative organisation, is highly centralised with respect to 
formulation, setting and implementation of national policies and 
programmes (Hanson and Walles, 1975)1 the political administration 
remains largely impervious to suggestions that power should be vested 
anywhere but at the centre. However, within this national
policy making i.e. ’top-down’, role of central government.is concealed the 
balance between the components of policy i.e. formulation (intent) and 
physical implementation (impact). As Loasb.y notes:
"A choice is not effective without implementation which 
may be far from simple. It is dangerous to assume 
either, that what has been decided will be achieved 
or that what happens is what was intended."
(Loasby, 1976, p. 89)
As the operations of government have widened in response to changing 
social and economic conditions so the gap between intent and action has 
become increasingly apparent. In an attempt to bridge this gap a 
variety of agencies have evolved to discharge functions and physically 
implement policies in the name of government. This implies a separation
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of authority away from the central authorities towards the regional 
and local levels creating as a result two diametrically opposed 
objectives within planning itself:
i) To maintain the institutional system which has 
been created i.e. "allocative” planning, with a 
move towards the bureaucratisation of the planning 
function.
ii) To induce major changes in the system i.e. "innovative" 
planning, through the creation of powerful regional 
institutions.
Within the first objective the potential for introducing an increased 
effort towards planning at the region is limited, with the administration 
and therefore the capacity to formulate policy remaining highly 
centralised. What emerges is a system of top-down planning where, 
institutions which do become established tend to be confined to 
performing either a coordinating or an advisory role between the local 
and national levels.
On the other hand in response to new problems created by rapid
change, or to confront particularly severe and complex problems, the
establishment of new and powerful public institutions may be necessary. 
Aitkenhead (1979) has outlined five main ’political' theories of why 
government may resort to this action:
i) 'Buffer' theory - to protect certain activities
from political interference;
ii) 'Escape' theory - as a means of escaping known
weaknesses of the traditional government departments;
iii) 'Participation' or 'pluralist' theory - as a means 
of diffusing government power;
iv) 'Dirigiste' theory - suggests that if government
cannot do what it wants to do within the existing
administrative structure then it may create new
institutions to make these activities possible;
v) 'Too many bureaucrats' theory - if public opinion
is against the expansion of government then the 
creation of new institutions outside the civil 
service, by creating a quasi-civil service, 
provides an alternative way of extending 
government activities.
The numerous agencies which central government has evolved to 
generate these actions have not all been directed at local authorities, 
which have been primarily a historical development (Gillingwater, 1975)• 
number of ad hoc (quasi-governmental, para-statal etc ...) 
institutions have been set up 'at arms length' from government; some 
with specific purposes such as the nationalised industries, and others 
set up to perform a multitude of purposes such as the regional development 
agencies. The interesting feature of these institutions is that they 
represent ^bv/eromei^ttempts to adopt .. practices of private
enterprise i.e^ ( acting as if it was 'not government' (Jordan, 1976).
This indicates an acceptance by government of the need to move 
towards an innovative style of planning. Only by creating institutions 
independent from the traditional administrative machinery is it possible 
to devise new programmes and spend money in different ways i.e. act as 
a public entrepreneur. This is because:
"Elected authorities do not do these things well.
Politicians are necessarily and properly obliged to 
look after the largest and most vulnerable groups in
their constituencies ....  They tend to spread
resources thinly to please the maximum number of 
voters, and allocate them according to rigidly 
defensible rules. All that is good politics but 
bad development policy."
(Donnison, 197^ > P« ^1)
This criticism of the allocative qua instrumental view of planning 
at the region, where policy decisions become governed by short-term 
political expediencies rather than by explicitly defensible reason^
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is supported by Chadwick (1971) who questions the ability of planning 
so defined to come to grips with the fundamental long-term problems 
of depressed regions. However, proposals to create independent
'ad hoc1 institutions within planning systems,such as exist in 
Britain ; can pose major problems - their lack of accountability
and the potentially undemocratic nature of their actions. As Das 
writing of the Indian experience has argued:
"Autonomous State Corporations tend to operate as 
independent bodies with objectives and policies 
often at variance with the general economic policy 
of the government."
(Das, cited in Hanson, 1963 p* 33*0
If, therefore, 'ad hoc' institutions are to have any political 
significance their creation in a form in which they would be 
responsible to no-one (i.e. complete autonomy) would appear to be both 
undesirable and unlikely. It is inevitable that where power is being 
wielded and money is being spent the political leadership will be 
concerned with the activities of these institutions.
3-3 Institutional Accountability
By its very nature innovative planning consists of a variety of 
independent, uncoordinated, and competitive thrusts which represent 
within society nodes of intense change (Alden and Morgan, 197*0 • in 
this context the role of the allocative planner becomes one which 
attempts to check what might otherwise become an undemocratic form of 
planning, and to ensure that the interests of the societal system as 
a whole are safeguarded. This need to bring innovative
institutions within the allocative purview of government i.e. by holding 
them accountable, inevitably creates tension with their conflicting 
claims for independence. . .
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Robinson (1971) has identified three broad dimensions of 
institutional accountability each of which may be applied in a variety 
of forms:
a) Programme accountability - where the agency is
held responsible for the tasks that it delegates 
to perform and the objectives which it pursues;
b) Process accountability - where the concern is
with the way a particular programme or task has 
been discharged;
c) Fiscal accountability - where the concern is
to make sure that all the money is spent for the 
purposes for which it was intended e.g. “Hqroi^hthe. 
publication of annual reports.
The exercise of accountability and the form in which it is 
requested will determine the operational parameters of planning 
institutions and, therefore, the extent to which innovative planning 
may become established • For example, an agency with financial autonomy 
(i.e. its own source of income) which is able to avoid the day to 
day scrutiny of ordinary government departments will tend more towards 
an innovative mode of operation, whilst rigid conditions of accountability 
will limit the institution to an allocative mode.
Xssues of accountability must inevitably mean that 
institutions are not only answerable for deviations from or failure 
to achieve objectives and targets formally agreed and authorised, but 
are answerable to any kind of criticism or fears of undemocratic 
government. Such arguments are an essential component of the innovative - 
allocative planning conflict where the demands for independence on the 
one hand and accountability on the other can never both be fully 
satisfied. It is the task of the policy maker to achieve between 
these extremes the subtle balance required to ensure the effectiveness 
of public action without threat to 'democracy1 according to its 
conventional wisdom.
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3.6 Reiteration
It is convenient at this stage to reflect on some of the main 
arguments in favour of development agencies (as
independent ’ad hoc’ institutions) which have emerged from the 
discussion so far.
Convention
Where previous experience or examples set elsewhere have shown 
that an appropriate institutional solution for tackling certain problems 
or sets of problems exists, then it may be expedient to adopt that 
solution. By drawing on previous practice in this way new activities 
can be expected to encounter less opposition from their novelty.
Limitations of Bureaucracy
This is an essential element in the general argument concerning 
planning style. Like other organisations, government i.e. the civil 
service, is likely to build up patterns of behaviour and operational 
procedures which become natural to itself. These will tend to become 
reinforced as the organisational structure evolves. However, where 
new and unusual types of problems are encountered this form of 
organisation, with its inherent 'practices' ( the civil service 
'culture') may prove incapable of generating the necessary actions. 
Therefore, in order to develop fresh ideas and initiative new forms of 
organisation may be required.
The 'Clean Sheet'
Following on from the previous point it is contended that it is 
easier to set up a new institution than it is to reform or modify an 
existing one. It has already been argued that a new institution
will be able to develop its own structure and patterns of behaviour in 
order to promote rather than resist change. Taken a step further, this 
implies that the disbanding of old and the creation of new institutions 
in response to changing conditions is an on-going exercise.
In this way organisations will evolve rather than become institutionally 
and behaviouraly entrenched.
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Freedom from Political Interference
It is contended that public institutions will be better equipped 
to confront certain types of problem e.g. severe regional decline, 
if they can avoid the day to day scrutiny of ministers and resist the 
forces of external political pressure. This leads to the argument 
that some types of institution should be allowed to operate 
independent from government and that establishing them in the form 
of autonomous or semi-autonomous bodies can achieve this.
Efficiency
It is argued that independent institutions are more likely to 
operate efficiently in terms of achieving their objectives than are 
ordinary government departments. This is because, unlike the ’process’ 
orientated departments, independent organisations are better able to 
single mindedly set about the task(s) assigned to them. This may 
also explain why single function agencies are invariably more successful 
(in effiency terms) than their multi-functional counterparts.
However, it must be recognised that the notion of efficiency 
carries with it some large and questionable assumptions that efficiency 
can be determined by administrative form. Though it would appear to 
be generally accepted that certain organisational structures hamper 
efficiency without necessarily implying that others will generate it.
3.7 Conclusions
It has been argued in this chapter that many of the institutional 
features of regional development agencies represent an attempt by 
government to initiate a new style of planning i.e. innovative planning, 
at the region. In innovative planning society is provided with a 
powerful tool with which to confront the complex and serious problems 
which often fail to correspond with the existing 
institutional structure of society, and which therefore require some 
new institutional form to tackle them.
However, despite the attractions of innovative planning in terms 
of its affinity with regional planning it does suffer a number of 
disadvantages in its translation into planning systems. These result
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largely from the fact that it is often regarded as an inherently 
undemocratic form of planning, and one which is carried out without 
regard for its wider impact. It appears unlikely, therefore, that 
innovative planning would ever completely replace allocative planning 
at the region (Friedmann, 1966). This inevitably means that 
'innovative' institutions i.e. regional development agencies, are held 
in a constant state of tension between their conflicting claims for 
independence and the wider demands for institutional accountability.
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CHAPTER
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGIONAL PLANNING MACHINE IN BRITAIN
k.l Introduction
Many of the ideas of regional planning, embodied in the development 
agency concept, have been translated into Britain with the creation of 
the Highlands and Islands Development Board in 1965? and more recently 
the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies in 1975- This did not take 
place within a "policy vacuum11, but has been the result of a gradual 
eyoiufion Of policy Qinrteci at the region. Therefore, before going 
on to discuss the course development agencies have taken, it is 
necessary to examine the context within which they were concieved by 
identifying some of the main policy events and influences which lay 
behind their creation.
k.2 The Development of Regional Planning
Although political parties have differed in the degree of state 
intervention necessary, each has been committed to the general 
principles of a policy for the regions (Kellas, 1977)* Yet regional 
intervention does not have a particularly long history in Britain, 
where the main developments have been primarily . post-war •
One of the major motivations for intervention was the growing 
concern for the physical environment, with continued post-war 
metropolitan expansion threatening to create insoluble economic, social 
and physical problems (Hall, 1975)* From this there emerged a kind 
of physical planning, i.e. town and country planning, at the region 
exemplified by the plans produced by Sir Patrick Abercrombie for 
Greater London in 19kk and the Clyde Valley in 19*1-6. Though 
these strategy plans were purely advisory and no administration system 
was established to implement their proposals they ranked as important 
documents in terms of the substantive issues covered and the approach 
to regional planning which they adopted (Alden and Morgan, 197*0-
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A second major reason for intervention at the region (and
arguably the most important), which did not fully emerge until the late
1950's and early 1960's, was a concern for the inadequate growth rates
of regions suffering from high levels of unemployment. Out of this
concern emerged a system of ad hoc measures, consisting largely of
state control and subsidisation of industrial location i.e. regional
d o r h * .
policy (though regional policy measures/(back as far as the 1930's) 
whichiO&fSL designed to take positive steps towards reducing the 
unemployment levels in the depressed areas of Scotland, Wales and the 
North of England.
Other pressures for the creation of a system of regional planning 
gained expression during the 1960's, with the emergence of issues of 
autonomy and regionalism as a reaction against the centralist 
tendencies of government, and the increased difficulties in administering 
a complex society.
From these influences emerged a post-war system of regulatory 
planning ( Hall, 1975) which made no attempt to include a policy of 
general economic planning, or to develop "corporate" institutions of 
intervention. This was in marked contrast to the French system of 
indicative planning which relied heavily on the coordination of public 
and private investment programmes through a complex administration 
machinery. In Britain, therefore, suggestions such as those contained 
in the Barlow Report (19^0), for the creation of a regional development 
corporation as an instrument of regional planning, were taken no further.
Yet, despite the increased policy efforts of the late 1950's 
to assist the regions, the growing crisis of manufacturing and the 
persistence of regional, problems in Britain meant that the effectiveness 
of regional intervention was becoming increasingly diminished. This 
became reinforcedWfHi the growing complexity of problems facing town 
and country planning around this period, particularly in terms of urban 
development and communications. By the end of the 1950's, therefore, 
these trends had provoked a movement towards a stronger state inter­
ventionist and planning role at the region, with a recognition that in 
order to make policy more effective new institutions capable of generating 
these actions would be required.
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4.3 The Machinery of Planning
The creation of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) 
by the Conservative Government in i960, marked an important step in 
the "regional thinking” of government. Through its attempts to provide 
and plan for a faster rate of growth in Britain, the NEDC was 
instrumental in raising a number of important regional issues, in 
particular the contribution of the region s' efforts towards national 
prosperity. This concern for the economic aspects of
growth helped bring a new perspective to regional policy.
However, it was not until the Labour Government of 1964, which 
was historically committed to helping the less prosperous areas 
(Alden and Morgan, 1974).,that a real political acceptance of the need 
for planning at the region was heralded. This, along with the growing 
disenchantment among many economists and planners with the previous 
form of policy (Hall, 1975), provided the context for the Labour 
Government's reforms which included the creation of the Department of 
Economic Affairs (DEA) in line with the current ideas on indicative 
planning, and the setting up of a series of Regional Economic Planning 
Councils and Boards. Both these developments were seen as providing 
considerable momentum towards regionalism in Britain.
The Department of Economic Affairs, created in 1964 under the 
strong French influence on planning practice, lay at the heart of the 
Governments economic policy-making machinery (McCallum, 1979)* Its 
function was to devise a Five Year National Plan which would provide the 
framework whereby planning at the national level could be integrated 
with regional issues. A major element in the DEA's role, therefore, 
was to coordinate at the regional level many of the strands of policy and 
planning undertaken by central and local government, and the various ad 
hoc bodies such as hospital boards (Hughes, 1974), where much of the 
case for regional coordination arose from the frictions which existed 
between the responsible bodies. It was hoped, as a result of these 
measures, that a J|painless” redistribution of resources towards the lagging 
regions could be achieved.
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In order to provide the necessary elements of regional 
coordination under the DEA's scheme, the Labour Government announced 
in 196^ its intention to create a system of regional institutions - 
the Regional Economic Planning Councils and Boards - which were to come 
under the general control of the DEA.
k.4 Regional Institutions : The Regional Economic Councils and Boards
It was the Regional Economic Planning Councils and Boards, set up 
within each of the newly created Economic Planning Regions (8 in England 
with 1 each in Scotland and Wales\ which represented the most significant 
move towards creating a system of planning at the region. A-lthough
the idea of regional representation was well established, nothing like the 
Councils, and to a lesser extent the Boards, had previously existed in 
Britain.
The Councils as advisory bodies were to represent the regions 
interests at national level, even though they were not to be made 
electorally responsible to the region itself. Instead, they were 
made up of Government appointed regional representatives,such as trades 
unionists, industrialists, academics, and other local public figures, who
were to serve on a temporary basis. To do this the new Councils were
given the following terms of reference:
i) to assist in the formulation of regional plans 
having regard to the best use of the regions 
resources;
ii) to advise on the steps necessary for implementing 
the regional plans on the basis of information 
and assessments provided by the Regional Economic 
Planning Boards;
iii) to advise on the regional implications of national 
economic policies.
In practice, however, their operations revealed a number of basic 
flaws (Alden and Morgan, 197^)• In particular, their lack of 
executive powers and autonomy meant that the Councils proved to be at 
best a forum by which central government policies could be scrutinised,
3^
and where regional dissatisfaction could be given more formal expression, 
though there was no means of guaranteeing their advice would
be accepted. This was highlighted early on in the Councils existence 
when the local authorities, feeling their autonomy was threatened, 
joined together to form a series of standing conferences against the 
new machinery. This inevitably led to severe operational problems for 
the Councils who, having no powers of their own, relied entirely on the 
cooperation of the authorities for plan implementation. These problems 
were made even more severe for the Councils by their limited staff 
resources, and the difficulty in generating real local support for 
their actions - a problem which . .. faces any non-elected form
of administrative decentralisation.
In this respect the Regional Economic Planning Councils can be 
said to accord very strongly with the. allocative mode of planning - 
possessing low levels of autonomy and a high degree of implementation 
dependence - and as such, represent a weak form of planning institution 
at the region (see Chapter 3)*
The Regional Economic Planning Boards on the other hand, whilst 
being the least innovative part of the new institutional arrangement, 
did not suffer quite the same operational problems as the Councils.
The intention of the Boards, comprising largely of civil servants, was 
to provide a ’’lateral” link between the variety of Government 
departments already operating in the region, whilst retaining an 
unchanged vertical decision making structure (Alden and Morgan, 197*0 
where:
”....  their creation would not affect the existing
powers and responsibilities of local authorities or 
existing Ministerial responsibilities.”
(Hansard, 10 December 197*0
The product of this arrangement was that the Boards retained a 
central i.e. Whitehall orientation and}thereby, a weak regional 
focus and commitment, achieving little more than to coordinate and adjust 
matters of detail (Self, 1970)•
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It is apparent^/ on the basis of this evaluation, the
Eegional Economic Planning Councils and Boards as a form of 
administrative decentralisation rather than heralding a new era in 
integrated land-use and economic planning, served only to illustrate 
the weaknesses of this kind of institutional arrangement at the region. 
This view is reflected by Peterson (1966) who concluded in his study 
conducted soon after the creation of the new machinery, that their 
weaknesses would serve to indicate the need for more radical 
institutional change at the region.
^•3 Eegional Development in Scotland
Within Scotland (and to a lesser extent Wales) there have emerged 
considerable differences in the practice and machinery of
regional planning from that which exists in the rest of Britain. This 
is due in part to the framework for policy making which exists in 
Scotland which, unlike that of an arbitrary administrative unit, Mis 
that of a historic nation, which was once a state" (Kellas, 1977 P« 2) 
which has been characterised by "institutional leadership and political 
innovation" (Scotsman, 23 August 1979)- Through this modified context 
for policy formation and implementation, and with the existence of a 
strong national identity and a devolved administration in the Scottish 
Office, Scotland has provided the "seed-bed" for administrative innovation 
in Britain (Gillingwater, 1973)-
For many years in Scotland the combination of persistent 
unemployment, high net migration, and slow employment growth, 
represented the outward manifestation of deep rooted economic, social 
and environmental problems. By the late 1930's the apparent divergence 
of its economic performance, relative to that of most other regions in 
Britain, saw within Scotland a change in the climate of opinion over 
issues of regional economic planning away from a preoccupation with the 
relief of unemployment, to a wider understanding of the basic problems 
of which unemployment was but one symptom.
Instrumental in this view was the publication in 1961 of the 
Toothill Eeport (Inquiry into the Scottish Economy 1960-6l)j providing 
as it did an elegant framework for action by highlighting Scotland's
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regional imbalance not only as a waste of national resources, but 
as a serious constraint on the successful management of the economy. 
Within this it illustrated the need for coordinated plans o f regional 
development as a means towards greater national prosperity. However, 
the report, though tacitly acknowledging that a distinct economic 
system was at work in Scotland, did not, as this might suggest, 
advocate that separate policies be devised for north of the border.
The interwoven nature of certain sectors of the Scottish and English 
economies, it was argued, would make that an inappropriate proposition.
From the Toothill Report emerged the philosophy that regional 
policy should be sensitively designed to concern itself as much with 
the modernisation of indigenous Scottish industry as it was with the 
importation of new projects from elsewhere. Secondly, the Report 
recognised that there already existed in the Scottish Office an 
administration uniquely capable of providing this greater
sensitivity to local requirements. From this the role of the Scottish 
Office in regional development affairs was to be gradually strengthened.
The creation within this 1,umbrella',, organisation (. the Scottish 
Office) of the Scottish Development Department in 19&2, designed to take 
over the industrial and planning functions of the various Scottish 
Departments, was an attempt by government to coordinate regional 
development measures in Scotland on a basis not possible elsewhere in 
Britain (see Figure *+.l). Other Scottish initiatives around this time 
included the publication of the White Paper : Central Scotland (A 
Programme for Development and Growth) in 19635 which provided for the 
creation of eight growth centres to form the focal point of growth 
within the wider region (Glasson, 197*0 •
However, it was not until the 1966 White Paper : The Scottish 
Economy 196^-70, that the first real plan was produced for the regions. 
Unlike the stream of regional strategies and studies being produced 
between 1965 and 1971 hy the Regional Economic Planning Councils 
(Hughes, 197*0, the White Paper was a true plan in the sense of 
specifying targets to be achieved whilst enjoying some degree of 
government commitment rather than being purely advisory (McCrone, 197&).
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Through this document the Scottish Office was able to have its first 
real attempt at planning for the Scottish sub-regions by taking into 
account 'local* requirements. In this respect Scotland was 
at the forefront of thought on regional development in Britain.
The White Paper for all its foresight was, nevertheless, poor 
as a 'practical plan1. For example, it was excessively optimistic 
about the growth prospects of the Scottish economy, this inevitably 
resulted in the setting of unrealistic targets (McCrone, 1976). Yet 
despite this it remained an influential document raising many important 
issues on regional development and its potential within Scotland.
In particular it highlighted the ability of the sub-national units, such 
as the Highlands, to contribute to their own as well as the national well­
being.
The bearing of Scotland during this phase of regionalism in
the early 1960's was made even more important with the creation in 1965
of the Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB). This saw for
the first time within Britain a real attempt to embody _ the ideas
of regional planning and development through the creation of new and
powerful regional institutions. Its introduction as a development 
arecaQPrtion oF
agency saw/the need for a more selective approach towards regional problems, 
and an acceptance that the region could provide more than simply a 
framework for information gathering and advisory planning (as characterised 
by the Regional Economic Planning Councils and Boards), bvfF 
the appropriate level for autonomous development. The significance of 
the HIDB is discussed more fully in the following Chapter.
k.6 The Present System
Since the Highland Board several other developments in the 
machinery of regional economic planning in Scotland and Britain have 
taken place. In particular- the creation in 1975 of a new generation of 
development agencies for both Scotland (Scottish Development Agency) and 
Wales (Welsh Development Agency) was of major significance marking a new 
direction for government intervention at the region. (See Chapter 6 for a. 
detailed discussion on the Scottish Development Agency).
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FIGURE k.2
THE MACHINERY OF EEGIONAL PLANNING : SCOTLAND
BRITAIN
Cabinet/Parliament
Treasury
All taxes and 
public expenditure
Trade
Imports/exports 
Airports
Industry
Non-selective supports 
and guidelines 
Nationalised industries 
and Govt/industry relations 
National Enterprise Board
Energy
Oil, gas, coal, atomic
Employment
Training (former Regional 
Employment Premium)
Environment
Rail, Freight, Ports, Docks
SCOTLAND
Scottish Office
Scottish Economic Planning Department
Selective regional assistance 
New Towns 
Electricity 
Road and sea transport 
Scottish Development Agency 
Highlands and Islands Development 
Board
Scottish Development Department
Local Government supervision 
Physical planning 
North Sea oil infrastructure 
Scottish Special Housing 
Association
Department of Agriculture and 
Fisheries for Scotland
Administers UK and EEC price 
supports
Forestry Commission (under Scottish 
Secretary in Scotland)
Scottish Council (Development and 
Industry)Promotional body.
Scottish Chamber of Commerce
Convention of Scottish Local 
Authorities
Etc.
(Source: after Kellas (1977)
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At the Scottish level other developments which have had a 
bearing on regional planning include the creation in 1971 of the 
Scottish Industrial Development Office (SIDO). Whilst within the 
Department of Trade, and not the Scottish Office, SIDO was able to 
administer industrial grants in Scotland without reference back to 
Whitehall. Following on from this the creation within the Scottish 
Office, of the Scottish Economic Planning Department (SEPD) in June 1973 
saw another move towards strengthening the Scottish level of regional 
policy decision-making. The role of SEPD,taking over the function of 
SIDO,was to advise the Secretary of State on matters relating to 
industrial and economic development in Scotland, including the administration 
of selective financial assistance under the Industry Act 1972 (town and 
country planning remained under the supervision of SDD - see Figure *f.l), 
and also to act as the immediate coordinating and sponsoring body for 
much of the regional planning machinery in Scotland, including the 
development agencies
However, with the decline in the number of areas eligible for 
regional policy assistance in Scotland under the current measures, 
the importance of SEPD's selective assistance appears to have declined 
relative to the operations of other major British Departments (see 
Figure ^.2). Yet in its role as the overseeing administrative and 
bureaucratic arm of the Scottish Office, the influence of SEPD on the
I
operations of other agencies, such as the Highlands and Islands 
Development Board and the Scottish Development Agency, has become 
increasingly important•
A.7 Conclusions
It was not really until the 1960's that regional planning in 
Britain developed to include some element of economic planning, Before 
this regionalism had emerged . / from a concern for the problem of
town and country planning, i.e. physical development. However, under 
the influence of key events and a growing awareness of the problems of 
the region, the need for strategies capable of incorporating a concern 
for physical development and regional economic policy was becoming clear.
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The creation of a system of regional planning in the form of 
Regional Economic Planning Councils and Boards in 196^ (the Councils 
have since been abolished in 1979) was a reflection of this swing 
culminating in the National Plan of 1966 and the variety of regional 
strategies and reports. This was an important innovation at the 
region where for the first time an attempt was made to create an 
institutional focus between the central and local layers of government.
However, it soon became apparent that this system of advisory 
planning, with the region being denied any real power, was wholly 
inadequate in confronting the complex problems of the region and in 
satisfying the needs of regional planning. These would require the 
creation of new institutions capable of reconciling the ever changing 
and conflicting interests of power groups (Allan, 197*+)- Clearly this 
was not the task of decentralised government departments, but the task 
of regional institutions altogether more powerful and autonomous.
This emerged with the creation of the Highlands and Islands 
Development Board in 1965 and the Scotttish Development Agency in 1975-
k2
CHAPTER 5
THE BRITISH PROTOTYPE : THE HIGHLANDS AND ISLANDS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD
5-1 Introduction
The creation of the Highlands and Islands Development Board in 19&3 
was a landmark in the development of British planning practice. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, the use of the region in the
sixties was primarily one of administrative convenience, with governments 
defining the region differently for specific purposes but always without 
autonomy (Sant, 1977)* The Highland Board marked a distinct break from 
this tradition, where it was argued the particular problems of the 
Highlands'*" required a specific problem-based form of government 
intervention.
The "Highland Problem” (Youngson, 1973» Adams, 197&, Bryden and 
Houston, 1976), as it became known, had usually been expressed in terms 
of a declining population and ageing population structure. As Mackay (1978) 
points out underlying and serving to reinforce these trends was the 
decline of employment in the primary sector and the lack of alternative 
employment opportunities. Decades of this process unchecked had 
drained communities of the young and most able, leaving a lack of 
initiative, leadership and local capital to develop indigenous employment 
opportunities (MacGregor, 1979)*
In order to break this vicious cycle of emigration various 
official and unofficial agencies were set up in the Highlands, from 
the Napier Commission who published their report in 188*+ to the Advisory 
Panel for the Highlands and Islands which was set up in 19^7 and was not 
dissolved until 19^3• It showed that the permanency of the Highland
The definition used refers to the seven crofting counties of Argyll, 
Caithness, Inverness, Orkney, Ross and Cromarty, Sutherland and Zetland 
(see Figure 3-1)•
problem could never be adequately resolved by the numerous advisory . 
bodies and local authorities represented in the region, but that there 
should be more radical changes in the arrangement for controlling 
land affairs in the Highlands and Islands. The realisation that 
these were problems that town and country planning it its conventional 
sense could not encompass meant that completely new solutions would 
need to be found (Grieve, 1980).
Since within Britain there was no previous experience of ad hoc 
interventions capable of confronting the deep rooted problems of the 
Highlands to draw upon much of the inspiration ea.co£, 1 from planning 
practice overseas. Through
the example of schemes like the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and 
the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, the notion of a locally orientated 
development body capable of offering a comprehensive approach to 
development, and with sufficient autonomy, finance and executive power 
to generate these actions, seemed to provide the appropriate formula 
(see Chapter 2). Under this influence and using the New Town Development 
Corporation legislation as its basis (Smith, 1975 )t the Highlands and 
Islands Development Board found its way on to the Statute Book in 19&5 
as a kind of ’’regional development corporation".
5-2 The Highlands and Islands Development Board
The HIDB was established under the Highlands and Islands Development 
(Scotland) Act 1965 and its powers were slightly increased under the 1968 
Act of the same name. The background to the Act lay in the long history 
of unsuccessful development attempts unique to the Highlands, and the 
broader changes in "regional thinking" of the mid-1960's. Being 
a completely new arrangement to Britain, Parliament was^unclear of its 
potential and found it difficult to establish a yardstick £ which it 
should operate. As a result the Board was given a very wide remit 
in its area (see Figure 5*1) with its objectives set as first;"to assist 
the people of the Highlands and Islands to improve their economic and 
social conditions", and second,"to enable the Highlands and Islands to 
play a more effective part in the economic and social development of the 
nation" (HIDB, 1979 a).
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In order to pursue these broad objectives the Board was given 
a unique set of powers unparalleled in their strength and breadth 
within British regional policy, these included:
i) The ability to acquire land by agreement or with
the approval of the Secretary of State for 
Scotland by compulsory purchase, and to hold, 
manage, and dispose of land;
ii) To erect buildings and to carry out other
operations on the land;
iii) To form or acquire shares in a company with
the approval of the Secretary of State;
iv) To conduct in its own right either directly
or indirectly any business or undertaking;
v) To provide management and advisory services
to individuals or companies;
vi) To give financial assistance by way of grant
or loan to any person or company carrying out 
or proposing to carry out business in the area;
vii) To commission or carry out research.
To give these powers expression the Board was given a source of 
income.in the form of wholly voted money controlled by annual budgets 
settled with the Secretary of State within the legislation. The 
Board was also required to seek ministerial support over the use of 
particularly sensitive powers such as the compulsory purchase of land. 
Furthermore, as Haddow (1979) notes, Parliament's lack of trust in the 
Secretary of State and the Board to get on with the job without further 
guidance resulted in the establishment of the Highlands and Islands 
Development Consultative Council (HIDCC) to advise the Board on the 
exercise of its functions.
As a government agency the executive of the Highland Board was 
rather unusual, consisting of seven full-time persons (including the 
Chairman) who were appointed by the Secretary of State. The HIDB 
(Scotland) Act 19&5 also specified that these whole-time members 
should be in the majority— this having been conceded under pressure 
by the Parliamentary Opposition who argued that only in this way 
could the effectiveness of the Board be secured (Haddow, 1979).
Due to its uniqueness, and what appeared at the time to be 
substantial powers, the HIDB was heralded by many as a measure which 
could ’’if applied properly pave the way for revolutionary change in 
the seven crofting counties51 (New Statesman, 12 March 1965? P* 386).
As a body separate from the regular central departments (for example 
SEPD which consisted entirely of civil servants) with ’’autonomy to 
formulate its policy and carry it out” (McCrone, 1965), the Board 
would be able to provide a strong regional counter-force to the centralist 
tendancies of government, and be able to affect significantly its own 
economic and physical environment. There came with its creation a 
feeling of tremendous optimism and expectation in the Highlands 
(Carter, 1975).
5-3 The HIDB in Practice
The somewhat strange policy process which created the HIDB, with 
the choice of policy instrument (i.e. the HIDB itself) preceding any 
real notion of what needed to be done to solve the "Highland Problem55, 
meant that the remit set by Parliament, which was to guide the Board 
in practice was never spelled out in any great detail. As a result 
it was left to the Boardpartially through a process of trial and errorJ 
to find its own role (MacGregor, 1979).
To a considerable extent the operations of the Board were conditioned 
by the actual and perceived nature of the problems it was to confront. 
Within this there was an implicit assumption, or theory of development, 
in the Board that the Highlands was a poor rural region ("traditional" - 
like the Mezzogiorno in Southern Italy) which,in order to develop 
in the face of plannings conventional wisdom needed to be made "modern".
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In the words of the first Chairman, Professor Robert Grieve, the area 
was regarded by the Board as one which :
"the various revolutions in agriculture, industry
and technology have passed by"
(HIDB, 1967, p. 1)
This process of "modernisation" was to be achieved by importing into 
the Highlands a package of "norms". For example, throughout the 
Boardfe early annual reports a heavy emphasis was placed on the 
introduction of manufacturing industry as providing the most urgent 
and long-term basis for development in the area (Carter, 1975)* This 
reflected the urban-industrial bias of both the practice and philosophy 
of planning, and the need to bring the Highland economy more closely into 
line with the national economy.
From the outset the HIDB recognised the success of its efforts 
towards improving the area's economic and social well-being depended 
on its ability to relate them to a regional .strategy. The principle 
features of which, in terms of the powers available, was the Board's 
capacity for:
a) Selectivity or discretion;
b) A comprehensive approach sectorally, and in the
range of inducements it could offer.
As a result^the Board was able to involve itself on a broad front 
to strengthen the base of the Highland economy. To this end it became 
actively involved in supporting and promoting all the main sectors in 
the region including agriculture, forestry, fishing, tourism and 
manufacturing.
At first the Board tried to adopt conventional regional strategies 
such as the growth-centre approach, seeing the key to Highland regeneration 
in terms of urban and industrial expansion. Within this, however, the
role of the HIDB was limited to promotion and financial assistance in the
form of grants and loans, with the statutory planning powers for
infrastructure and housing remaining with the planning authorities - the 
burghs and the counties (MacGregor, 1979)* Despite the powers
available to the Board (what it could use was a different matter) little 
attempt was made during its formative years to selectively discriminate 
between possible ventures (Adams, 1976),or in an entrepreneurial way 
create new ventures itself. Consequently the HIDB emerged as a 
responsive agency— a kind of '’merchant bank with a social purpose”
(Grieve, 1973)-
The ability to undistort national priorities and adopt those most 
suited to the region was seen as an essential feature .cF any programme 
of development For the Highlands. As a result the HIDB, despite its 
manufacturing emphasis, began to vigorously promote a programme of 
tourism which, it was argued, would provide employment opportunities in 
the rural areas as well as contributing to the national interest 
(HIDB, 1967). At this time the Board was the only body equipped with 
the necessary powers and finance to further this work. Nevertheless, 
there was a great deal of criticism of the strategy, in particular the 
unjustifiably high proportion of HIDB finance allocated to it; accounting 
for AA.9 per cent of total grant aid, during the period 196^-70 
(MacGregor, 1979)>and the lack of any real mention in the early reports 
of the dangers of tourism. Yet despite the criticisms this showed 
the ability of the Board to act in an innovative way by setting its own 
budgetary and operational priorities.
This ’’innovative" capacity of the HIDB , became limited in
practice by the existence of many other Government departments or 
agencies operating within the Highlands and dealing with different 
programmes or parts of programmes. As a result, it took in many cases 
considerable time and negotiation for the Board to establish for itself 
a role.
Figure 9*2 illustrates the HIDB's external relationships and 
interactions. These have taken place at essentially three levels - 
national, local and regional. This ^ InterT-corporate®' dimension 
(Aitkenhead, 1979) of the Board's activities had an important bearing 
on its ability to coordinate and offer a unity of approach to development 
in the Highlands.
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FIGURE 5.2
HIGHLANDS AND ISLANDS DEVELOPMENT BOARD : 
RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERACTIONS
1 Top-Down1
The Secretary of State for Scotland and the Scottish Office, 
especially the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for 
Scotland (DAFS), the Scottish Development Department (SDD)* and 
the Scottish Economic Planning Department (SEPD);
The Treasury;
Other GB Departments with remit in Scotland including the 
Department of Employment, the Department of Industry (via the 
SEPD and the Scottish Development Agency), and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries;
Ultimately the.Cabinet;
EEC.
Same Level
Highlands and Islands Development Consultative Council (HIDCC);
Statutory bodies including the Crofters Commission, Forestry 
Commission, Countryside Commission for Scotland, Scottish 
Development Agency, Scottish Tourist Board, White Fish Authority, 
Herring Industry Board, Scottish Transport Group etc;
Non-statutory bodies (’semi-official1) the Scottish Council 
(Development and Industry);
Local Authorities, pre 1975? the burghs and counties, post 1975? 
the Districts (with no powers for local planning or development 
control) and the Regions.
’Bottom-Up*
Councils of Social Service, Community Councils, Community 
Enterprises and Cooperatives, An Cammun, Local Constituency 
Parties, Churches, Local Businesses, Local Trades Unions, and 
other interest groups.
The general public.
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These variety of interactions inevitably bring with them conflicts 
and frictions which the development agency model is designed 
to reduce, if not remove (see Chapter J>) • For example, the Scottish 
Office with its all Scotland purview may wish to influence the activities 
of the HIDB in accordance with its own priorities, whilst on the other 
hand;the Board wanting to retain its autonomy, may wish to resist such 
pressure.
The most notable example of this "top-down" pressure being exerted 
on the Board's operations concerned the use of its powers for the
compulsory purchase of land. In its ninth annual report the Board
stated that:
"The intensification and rationalisation of land use 
in the Highlands remain an essential aim for the
continued viability of the rural economy and social
fabric of the region."
(HIDB, 197^, P.
Yet, as a result of political pressure from central Government who 
advised the Board against the use of its powers of compulsory purchase, 
and in the face of some local hostility by land-owners who feared ’"creeping 
socialism" in the Highlands, this important dimension of the Board's work 
was approached with extreme caution. This made the effective operation 
of the development strategy very difficult as:
"The Board does not only have to identify the right 
programmes by technical and economic criteria, it must 
have adequate contacts, understanding and support at 
the local level and a strong political presence at 
national Government level."
(Bryden and Houston, 1976, p. 139)
This potential for friction (or conflict) in the Board's work may 
occur at all levels. For example, local interest or pressure groups may 
try to influence the activities of the HIDB, whilst the Board for its part 
may wish to escape such pressures. Similarly, the fact that there remains
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a great variety of bodies in the area operating at the same level
(see Figure 5»2) clearly limits the ability of the Board, despite
its powers, to supercede or even coordinate activities in the
Highlands. This was made apparent with the re-organisation of Local
Government in Scotland in 1975 which saw the creation of a Highland
2
Regional Council to cover much of the Board’s area and population .
With statutory authority at both the strategic and local level the 
new Regional Council severely undermined the ’’strategic” planning 
function of the HIDB.
As a result of these external pressures and changes the Board, 
where possible, had to adapt in order to create for itself a new and more 
positive role towards Highland development. Recent policy moves,such as 
the establishment of a multi-purpose community cooperative scheme in 1977 
drawing largely from the Irish experience, and the proposals contained in 
the Board's fourteenth annual report for the establishment of a Highland 
craft centre (Craft point) for the dissemination of skills in design, 
management, production techniques and marketing (HIDB, 1979)jare recent 
examples of the Board acting and evolving in a positive way with "an ethos 
based on innovation” (Grieve, 1973)• The move towards cooperative 
development was seen as particularly noteworthy *Ail4V\ its emphasis on 
tackling the severe problems of the remote West and Islands.
With this new emphasis towards development in the remoter areas 
closer contact between the Board and the localities became essential.
As a result of this new dimension to its work, and in an attempt to move 
away from its image as a distant bureaucracy in Inverness, the HIDB 
decentralised some of its administration and appointed several field 
officers to help generate local initiatives well suited to local needs.
In this respect at least the Highland Board has moved from a responsive 
mode of operation to assume the role of advocate (MacGregor, 1979)*
2Also a largely unchanged Argyll County became a district within 
Strathclyde Region and Orkney, Shetland and the Western Isles became 
multi-purpose single tier authorities.
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3.^ The Highland Board as a Development Agency
At its inception in 1963 the Highlands and Islands Development Board 
was the first attempt by a British Government to initiate
a kind of "innovative” planning at the region through the creation of a 
new institution (see Chapter 3)- its organisation. embodied
many of the features of regional development agencies outlined in earlier 
chapters. Fof ayampic :
i) It has a regionally defined remit;
ii) To a substantial degree it is independent of the
central departments and the elected local authorities;
iii) It is an executive body, rather than a purely 
planning and advisory one;
iv) It has a wide range of responsibilities covering 
all sectors of the economy, although it has no 
authority over bodies involved in the same 
activities;
v) Subject to permission by the Secretary of State
for Scotland it has some quite extensive enabling 
powers to acquire land, start its own businesses 
etc, though it is only actually required to run a 
grants and loans scheme to private developers.
The Highland Board as an agent of development has operated with 
some degree of success, on this many commentators agree. In part this 
success has derived from the planning method employed by the Board which 
in some instances accords closely ’to that of innovative planning,aS 
formulated by Friedmann in 1966 (see Chapter 3)• As an institution
it has managed to fuse plan making with plan implementing by preparing a 
brief strategy then moving as quickly as possible into "performing a 
multitude of fruitful actions" (Grieve, 1972). However, the&efeatures of 
the Board have caused considerable concern among those who see its operations 
as "undemocratic" .—  in the exercise of its functions no account is 
taken of electoral responsibility (except indirectly, through the Secretary 
of State for Scotland). Therefore, in its executive role the Board finds 
itself fulfilling functions which might otherwise be undertaken by a 
"regional government".
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This lack of local accountability can create tension over the 
Board’s efforts,- Very often there are few formal channels through 
which the inhabitants of the region can influence decisions taken on 
their behalf. These difficulties (actual strengths in terms of the 
development agency concept) may be added to where, as in the case of the 
HIDB, the innovative institution is a product of political manoeuvering 
behind closed doors. In this way the people of the region not only 
have little say in its operation, but have virtually no say in its creation. 
As a result, the development agency is an institutional arrangement which 
faces a fundamental dilemma - gaining its strength from the freedom of 
action afforded by a lack of democratic control, whilst at the same time 
weakened by its lack of democratic authority.
In his paper McKay (1973) criticised the Board for its heavy emphasis 
on the economic aspects of Highland development (in terms of expenditure) 
rather than having a broader concern for the social and cultural aspects 
of development. This criticism is not confined to the HIDB alone, but 
one which has been levelled at most applications of the development agency 
idea. b.evelopment agencies have tended to operate on the basis of
certain "key assumptions" which , in order to establish that institution 
within the national adminstrative framework y become constantly repeated 
and heavily emphasised in the passing of legislation through Parliament • 
In this way it may prove difficult to throw off these assumptions later, 
especially given the administrative and political autonomy which preserves 
them from challenge. As a result, the ability of institutions to evolve in 
the face of changing circumstances and, therefore, their ability to respond 
creatively to new challenges may become severely constrained. This 
illustrates some of the weaknesses of translating theory into practice 
Friedmann (1966) for example, regarded the ability to learn from experience 
and adapt to changing circumstances as crucial for the successful 
implementation of a programme of innovative planning.
5*5 Conclusions
The Highlands and Islands Development Board incorporated in its 
organisation many of the ideas from the early regional development agencies 
such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Cassa peril Mezzogiorno.
4
As an executive body with a corporate form distanced from the local 
democratic process, and with a concern for economic development, the 
HIDB reflected a changing attitude within Britain towards measures
designed to aid the lagging regions. Yet despite its "advantages" the 
HIDB failed to match up to expectations. For example,the Board was 
given wide powers (it had no resposbility however for statutory planning), 
but limited finance, a wide remit to coordinate other public institutions, 
but with little real power to control their activities, let alone those 
of private capital within the region. These "constraints" did little 
to help the Board's choice of policy decisions where the very existence 
of control within an environment of uncertainty must limit the extent
to which regional institutions like the HIDB are free to fly in the face
of conventionally accepted theory and practice (Bryden, 1979)
Yet, as Magnusson notes:
"despite the traumatic experience that the Board and 
the Highlands have suffered, despite the lamentable 
lack of communication with the Scottish Office, the 
Board has at least shown the way and established new 
patterns of thinking that will assuredly bear fruit 
in the future.
(Magnusson, 1968)
This was undoubtedly the case in that support for the HIDB
experiment led to the creation of a new generation of agencies some years
later.
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CHAPTER 6
THE NEW GENERATION QE AGENCIES r 
THE SCOTTISH DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
6.1 Introduction and Background
Within Scotland orthodox regional policy measures have been in
operation since the 1930‘s and have almost certainly made some
S«e
contribution towards employment creation in the region (Moore and
Rhodes, 197*0- Yet as Table 6.1 shows, their operation appears to
have done little to radically alter Scotland's position relative to the
remainder of Britain— in particular the South and the Midlands of
England. It was becoming clear, therefore, by the 1970's QQCunsi"Q.
o rtd
background of continuing industrial decline and unemployment/ with a 
subsequent loss of skills from the region that more would be needed 
than the incentives under the 1972 Industry Act if these problems were 
to be tackled in any real way.
During this period the need for more radical approaches towards 
regional development was becoming supported by influential groups and 
individuals'*' throughout Britain. In Scotland for example the Labour 
Party had long argued the case for a Scottish based body with direct 
powers of development (Stephen, 1973)• Similarly, the Scottish Trades 
Union Congress (STUC) in its 197^ resolution on the Scottish economy 
contained inter alia a demand for:
"the establishment of a Scottish Development Authority 
to coordinate planning and initiate through a Scottish
State Holding Company ....  the compulsory purchase of
equity in firms and to establish enterprises where 
necessary."
(STUC (197^) cited in Brown, 1973, p. 228)
^See for example W Rodgers : Regional Development Corporation Bill, 
House of Commons, 1 December 1971-
36
TA
BL
E 
6.
1 
SE
LE
CT
ED
 
EC
ON
OM
IC
 
IN
DI
CA
TO
RS
 
BY 
BE
G 
IO
NS
sd
0•H-P 1—105A-P CAb0 1—1•H
s sd•H1—105O3 OsdOsd1—1<d P-p <0
CD ftft
0 1—1
hO A-05 1
rHCD VO
> CO
< 1—1
oj
o
I
IA
O
I
1—1 OJ A- LA CO 1—1 LA• • • • • • •
OJ A 1—1 1— 1 LA 0 LA
+ + 1 1 + 1 1
OJ
VO
I
VO
o
-psd
0
0
1—1
ft6CDsd
ft
CDIAhO A-05 1P OCDA-> CA
1—I
00 VO vo A- LA IA LA• • t • • • •
1—1 OJ OJ OJ IA IA IA
IA OJ H  
• •
LA LA
VO
-d-
IA
O
a -
c a
I—I
Uo o5 Ph -p•Hft ft « 05 CT5 O
-d-
CA
OO
A-OOO
VO IA 1—1 CA IA VO VO to O-d- -d- IA OJ OJ VO LA 0 -d"
A- A- A- A- A- VO VO A- A-
EHc/2
fdO ft•H P-ihO fb0) O
ft to
a
EH
02
<W
EH
02
m
EH02
M 02
F-Q
ftEH
O ft< I02 ft ft oto
ftH
PIft
PQ
57
So
ur
ce
: 
Ad
ap
te
d 
fr
om
 
Ma
nn
er
s 
et 
al 
(1
98
0)
Much of this campaign centred around the successful example of 
the Highlands and Islands Development Board. But perhaps of most 
importance in defining this crude notion into a usable product, and 
in the subsequent establishment of the Scottish Development Agency, was 
the publication in 197^ of the West Central Scotland Plan (WCSP) which 
contained as one of its recommendations the setting up of a Strathclyde 
Economic Development Corporation (SEDCOR).
The proposal for an industrial development Corporation (i.e. SEDCOR),
which would act 'at arms length1 from government;was based on the notion
that part of the problem of economic regeneration in West Central
Scotland lay in the inherent weaknesses of the existing machinery of
planning. Furthermore, it was argued that the existing general policy
of
measures under the Industry Acyi972, with their emphasis on mobile 
industry etc., were insufficiently 'tailored* to the area's
distinctive problems (WCSP, 197^)- To be successful policy efforts 
would need to look more closely at specific regional issues such as 
entrepreneurship, innovation, indigenous resources, technology and 
labour markets etc., and be able to adopt a longer term view of 
development than was possible under Hie existing government administration. 
These proposals rapidly became transformed into the broader notion of 
an all Scotland Development Corporation which culminated in the setting 
up of the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) in 1975-
Around the period of the early Seventies the successful image 
of the Industrial Authority for Ireland (IDA) - an autonomous agency 
more akin to a treasury than a development agency (see Duffy, 1980) - 
had already led many to conclude that a similar type of institutional 
arrangement, capable of providing a "one-door” approach to inward 
investment and a coordination of development activities, was needed for 
Scotland. The IDA was, therefore, to have a significant influence 
on the eventual organisation of the SDA.
It has been argued that the creation of a development
agency to cover the whole of Scotland owed more to the existence of a 
strong political will within the Labour Party towards devolution for 
Scotland and Wales than to any other influence. This is supported by
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the fact that agencies were created for both Scotland and Wales, whilst 
areas such as the North of England with similarly severe problems were 
denied analogous treatment (McCallum, 1979)- This was reinforced by 
the Government's commitment to greater regional assistance which 
became embodied in its (1975) Industrial Strategy, with its moves 
towards a more integrated planning discipline involving tripartite 
government, labour and management concencus of which the NEB, SDA 
and WDA proposals were an integral part.
6.2 The Scottish Development Agency
The creation of the Scottish Development Agency under the SDA (1975) 
Act did not meet with universal approval. Needless to say the 
Conservatives referred to it as little more than a clandestine attempt 
to extend state ownership in Scotland. While the Scottish National 
Party (SNP) saw it initially as a token effort by the Labour Government 
to prevent their threatened loss of votes north of the border. Yet 
despite this opposition the SDA was generally welcomed as an active 
attempt by government to assist and improve the economic future of 
Scotland and its people.
From the outset the SDA was given a broad remit which extended
2over the whole of Scotland and which included as its major objectives - 
the furthering of economic development; the provision, maintenance or 
safeguarding of employment; the promotion of industrial efficiency and 
international competitiveness; and the improvement of the environment 
particularly in the context of industrial dereliction and the improvement 
of urban and industrial surroundings (SDA Act, 1975)* In order to 
achieve these objects a broad range of functions were specified for the 
Agency. These included:
The ability to acquire, hold and dispose of 
securities;
To form corporate bodies or partnerships;
2
By agreement with the Highlands and Islands Development Board, most of the 
Agency's functions are performed by that Board within the HIDB area. 
Exceptions include land renewal, and where specific arrangements have been 
made for implementation by the SDA or by the SDA jointly with the HIDB.
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To make loans, give guarantees or give grants;
To act as an agent;
To acquire, and dispose of, manage and develop 
land and premises;
To make land and premises available for use by 
other persons;
To reclaim land;
To provide advisory services and to promote publicity 
relating to the functions of the agency.
The SDA was also to become responsible for the administration of 
selective financial assistance under Section 7 of the Industry Act 1972, 
i.e. to have a direct responsibility for industry in Scotland. However, 
these powers have been retained within the SEPD at the Scottish Office.
In carrying out these functions certain criteria of conformity 
were handed to the Agency from the Secretary of State. For example, 
the granting of loans and the making of investments were framed in the 
following terms:
nThe Agency is to charge a rate of interest not less 
than that paid by commercial firms of the highest 
standard when raising finance."
(SDA Guidelines, 1976, para. 19)
and
"(The SDA) must, as well as other factors, always 
have regard to the profitability of the enterprise."
(SDA Guidelines, 1976, para. 16)
It is clear, therefore, that right from the beginning the statutory 
position of the Secretary of State in relation to the Agency was a strong 
one. ' Although the specific day to day arrangements were delegated,
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government guidelines inevitably imposed severe constraints on 
the Agency's independence of operation. This politica.1 control noas 
also exercised by the Secretary of State through his power of 
nomination or approval for senior Agency appointments.
In order to carry out the purposes assigned to it the SDA was 
to receive via its sponsoring department SEPD substantial funding, 
with an initial sum agreed of £200 million over a period of five 
years, with the possibility of. a further £100 million subject to 
Parliamentary permission (Robertson, 1977)• These limits have been 
successively increased to the present (1981) figure of around £800 
million. Yet despite this apparently large amount of money there 
remains some controversy regarding just how much of it can genuinely 
be regarded as new, with estimates varying from as little as 30$ up 
to almost 80$^.
Part of the argument regarding SDA funding derives from the 
fact that at its inception the Agency absorbed into its organisation 
three bodies already existing and seen to be operating adequately 
within Scotland i.e. the Scottish Industrial Estates Corporation (SIEC) 
which had the function of factory building and maintenance, but not 
factory siting; the Small Industries Council for Rural Areas in 
Scotland (SICRAS); and some time later the Derelict Land Unit at the 
Scottish Office. There was in fact a high degree of continuity between 
these pre-existing organisations and their incorporation within the SDA 
(see later). This partly reflected the rationale that many of the 
economic and social problems of Scotland could be adequately dealt with 
by an expansion of these pre-existing functions. From this the SIEC 
and the Derelict Land Unit became included in the SDA's Environment 
Directorate, whilst SICRAS was transferred to the Industry Directorate 
to form the Small Business Division. These absorbed 'functional' 
activities were to account for a substantial degree of the SDA's 
operations (see later).
3
On the basis of various interviews.
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The introduction of some new activities and powers within the
SDA’s organisation to complement its inherited activities was
particularly important if the Agency was to represent any real change
in government strategy/from a reactive role, where programmes were
drawn up by private enterprise and local authorities and
for .
submitted to government/support (i.e. an allocative process - see 
Chapter 3)? to an innovative role where:
"As a powerful instrument ....  the Agency will
have the responsibility and resources to play 
a strong entrepreneurial role in identifying and 
promoting industrial modernisation, growth and 
development.”
(Consultative Document, 1975? P-2)
These "innovative” aspects of the SDA's operations were embodied in 
the Strategic Planning Department, and the Factory Policy Division 
within the Industry Directorate. The Strategic Planning Department 
as the "policy” planning section of the SDA was of crucial importance.
Its function was to evolve overall plans for investment which would 
involve the SDA in actively seeking out new programmes rather than 
waiting to act solely on the basis of applications by firms. The role 
of the Factory Policy Division in preparing overall strategies for 
factory building was rather less ambitious yet equally important in 
terms of the SDA's objectives.
It was this combination of allocative (i.e. the
inherited) and innovative functions within a single organisation which 
made the SDA a novel and distinctive institution of regional development.
6.3 The Innovative Elements
Industrial Investment
It is through its industrial investment function that much of the 
SDA's long-term aim of regenerating Scottish industry will ultimately 
depend. As the former Chief Executive, Lewis Eobertson put it:
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"The function which is potentially the most 
creative and possibly the most contentious is 
that of industrial investment. It is useful, 
therefore, to consider this task first and at 
greatest length though we must remember that it 
takes place against a continuing background of 
other activity."
(Eobertson, 1977? p»23)
In terms of industrial investment the SDA was given a broad and 
flexible range of powers allowing it to give guarantees, make loans 
and acquire share capital in companies. In order to do this the 
Agency was required to draw its finance from the National Loan Fund, 
and for equity purchases from public dividend capital. This is 
important as the capital requires to be serviced i.e. it cannot be 
given away. As a result^the Agency was obliged to operate its 
investment function according commercial criteria. This was 
reinforced by operational Guidelines laid down by the Secretary of 
State which specified that the Agency must show a minimum rate of return 
and must always have regard for the profitability of its investment 
i.e. it must be able to show the prospect of a commercially acceptable 
level of profit within a reasonable period of time, anything less 
than a pre-tax return of 20 per cent would require "additional 
justification" (SDA Guidelines, 1976). This clearly ruled any 
earlier notions that the Agency would be able to support unprofitable 
enterprises (Glasgow Herald, 8 March 1975)- In short the SDA was 
compelled to conduct its investment business on a commercial basis.
This emphasis on profitable firms necessarily limited the extent 
to which the Agency was able to invest, as profitable firms were able 
to secure finance elsewhere. This problem was partly overcome by the 
SDA aiding those enterprises which found it difficult to be considered 
by the private institutions. This inevitably meant that it was obliged 
to invest in areas carrying a certain amount of risk.
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This notion of profitability also illustrates the potentially
conflicting rationalities within the SDA in particular with its role
as job provider. A.s long as the Agency was investing in new
manufacturing enterprises it was creating jobs and thereby fulfilling
its employment remit. However, where the SDA invested in an existing
company which required re-organisation or which formed part of some
sectoral restructuring there was often no option of maintaining or
1+
safeguarding employment}but would instead have to shed labour . 
Evaluation
For a variety of reasons the evaluation of investment programmes 
is not easy. However, some crude assessment of the SDA's investment
•t'5function is provided in figure 6.2 where^industrial investment levels 
are compared with those of the WDA and with the other main areas of 
SDA activity. On the basis of these figures (see Table 6.2) there 
appears to be little evidence to suggest that either the SDA or the 
WDA have implemented or pursued a particularly aggressive investment 
programme. For example in 1979-80 a considerably larger proportion of 
SDA expenditure was directed towards its inherited activities; with 
factory provision and land renewal accounting for £38.5 million and 
£26 million respectively*, rather than towards industrial investment 
which accounted for only £6.3 million (SDA, 1980). This relatively 
small proportion of funding, despite the fundamental importance afforded 
investment within the SDA itself, may be a reflection of the constraints 
imposed on its operations by government - in particular 
profitability. The fact that up to January 1981 only ten SDA funded 
firms (out of a total of over 300) had gone into receivership, at a 
cost of around £7 million (Glasgow Herald, 23 January 1981), gives 
further indication of the SDA's cautious use of its investment powers.
1
There are signs that the SDAsemphasis with regard to industrial
doe
investment is changing. This is/ in part to the new investment 
guidelines (1980), which call for a greater involvement of private 
sector finance and also encourage the Agency to dispose of its
L(.
Under the revised SEPD Guidelines, 1980, the SDA is no longer obliged to 
maintain or safeguard employment although ceteris paribus preference should 
be given to projects employing more rather than less labour.
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investments at the earliest opportunity (SDA, 1980), But perhaps 
of greatest importance is the SDA's own attempts to move away from 
a cautious reactive mode of operation towards establishing a new and 
more positive role.
The creation of a new Industry Services Division is an attempt 
on the part of the SDA to provide a direct assistance to help improve 
the management efficiency of Scottish Industry. The increasing 
emphasis on technologically based companies through the establishment 
of a New Ventures Unit (NVU) reflects the increasing importance 
attached to these sectors by the Agency.
These moves are supported by the activities of the Planning 
and Projects Directorate (formerly the Strategic Planning Department) 
which has undertaken a variety of studies in an attempt to seek out 
new ideas and potential opportunities in Scotland. A major 
illustration of this was the SDA commissioned study of the Scottish 
electronics industry (SDA, 1979)*
It is this ability of the SDA to take the initiative which is 
its most important aspect (yet remains perhaps its least developed ).
. Regional policy in Britain has hitherto been restricted to the 
assistance of projects formulated by industry itself.
This brief assessment of the SDA's role in industrial investment 
to date has shown many of the limitations and inherent problems the 
development agency idea carries for such organisations, in particular 
just how to act dynamically . within the limits of what
government considers acceptable.
6.A The Allocative Elements
One of the main features of the SDA idea was the logic of 
incorporating within a single authority a variety of functions for 
industrial regeneration and environmental improvement (and later urban 
renewal) and to provide a strategic approach towards social and economic 
regeneration in Scotland.
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In practice, however, the SDA's ability to adopt a comprehensive 
approach to regional development in Scotland has been severely 
constrained by its external dependencies and the need to generate 
political support for its own actions. Mote for example the lack 
of disturbance in the work of the pre-existing organisations, the 
SIEC, the Derelict Land Unit and SICRAS within the SDA in order to 
reduce to a minimum potential opposition. This not only involves 
the accountability of the SDA to the 1 centre\ but often creates a 
complex process of interactions at other levels which Can have serious 
implications for the achievement of agency goals and project 
implementation (Aitkenhead, 1979)- Some brief examples are outlined 
below.
Land_Renewal
It was the limitations of local authorities to make much progress 
in reclaiming derelict land in Glasgow which saw the incorporation of 
an environmental improvement function within the SDA. Yet despite 
this move improvement schemes, although funded by the SDA, remain 
essentially those of the local authorities through which the schemes 
are implemented. As a result the successful operation of the Land 
Renewal Unit depends heavily on the goodwill of the Scottish Office and 
the cooperation of the many local authorities and public bodies 
(Thompson, 1980) and there is a clear reluctance to jeopardise this 
support by the SDA insisting on the itftfieintnVaVtoft of its own schemes.
Factory Schemes
As with land renewal the Agency's operations with regard to factory 
schemes have been largely 'reactive1. This has meant that the siting 
of SDA factories has been determined as much by political pressures from 
government, constituency MP's and local authorities as by objective 
economic criteria. Although through its Factory Policy Division and 
the Planning and Projects Directorate (formerly the Strategic Planning 
Department) the SDA claims to be moving away from this reactive role 
it still depends heavily on the support of local and central authorities 
to ensure that projects are implemented, and that a long term political 
commitment to the Agency's existence is sustained.
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6.5 The SDA as Coordinator
As well as its inherited functions and its investment and 
strategic planning roles, the SDA was also allocated the responsibility 
of coordinator in two main areas of activity - investment promotion, 
and in the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Scheme. More recently through 
the creation of Task Eorces at Cambusland, Glengarnock and Clydebank 
the SDA has established for itself a new and more creative role as a 
coordinating agency.
Investment Promotion
It had long been argued that the large number of promotional 
bodies operating in Scotland^such as the New Towns, Regional and 
District Authorities, SEPD, HIDB, etc., was not only wasteful of 
resources but was damaging to the overall promotional effort.
Furthermore, the success of the IDA 'in attracting overseas
investment seemed convincing evidence of the effectiveness of the 
'one-door' approach. As a result, in parallel with its investment 
function the SDA was given the responsibility (taking over from the 
Scottish Council (Development and Industry)) for coordinating the various 
promotional activities in Scotland.
In its capacity as coordinator the SDA has, however, operated 
with only limited success (House of Commons, 1980). _ Tt
is inevitable in a system where the officers of a regional authority 
simultaneou sly try to meet the requirements of the SDA and local 
politicians that some internal contradictions will emerge. These 
clashes of interest may occur at a variety of other levels, in particular 
between the region and the nation - with the SDA actively promoting 
Scottish locations whilst at the same time the Department of Industry is 
concerned to ensure that all British regions receive equal treatment 
(i.e. it adopts an allocative purview).
Within this system of diffused authority at the national, regional 
and sub-regional levels (not to mention the EEC) it is hardly surprising 
that the SDA has failed to provide an overall coordination of activity.
In this the SDA is further constrained by the fact that half of the
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financial package to incoming firms in Scotland lies outside its 
formal control, being the responsibility of the Scottish Economic 
Planning Department. In this respect the government, through 
SEPD, is able to exercise control over those developments it views 
as either politically or economically undesirable.
Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal
As in the case of industrial promotion the GEAR scheme serves 
to highlight some of the constraints which the SDA as both a regional 
development and 'coordinating1 agency has had to face.
Apart from its Scotland wide powers discussed earlier, the SDA 
was given the role of project coordinator in the Glasgow Eastern Area 
Renewal project which was to involve the activities of a large number 
of public agencies;including the Regional and District Authorities 
and the Scottish Office etc., in tackling the problems of 'deprivation' 
in the area. In order to bring these bodies together a Governing 
Committee made up of representatives of the various authorities was 
established. The role of the SDA in this was to provide the
strategic overview.
However, it became apparent right from the start that the SDA's 
ability to coordinate the policies and programmes of the various agencies 
was limited. The SDA was given no formal authority over their actions
and it was clear that there was little willingness on their part to 
surrender any degree of autonomy (Aitkenhead, 1979)*
There were also problems in generating the necessary commitment 
to the scheme,which after all was only a proportion of the total area 
of interest within each organisation and had to be continually weighed 
against other priorities. This was also evident within the SDA, where 
the inclusion of the GEAR scheme within its remit presented something 
of a conflict in policy objectives with on the one hand the Agency 
being committed to aiding' unfavourable locations in the east-end, 
whilst on the other being required to secure the most profitable 
return on its investments.
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The lack of success of the GEAR scheme must be attributed 
in large part to its inadequate orgnisational design, and/reluctance 
of the various agencies to concede any degree of autonomy to the 
strategic role of the SDA. As a result, the SDA has been unable 
to secure a proper fulfilment of its role in GEAR.
Task Forces
With the frustration and failure of GEAR still evident 
(Mowat, 1980) the establishment of area-based Task Forces within the 
SDA represented an important initiative. Unlike the GEAR project 
which was handed to the Agency after only six months of operation, the 
Task Force idea emerged from within the Agency itself as a response 
to the severe problems of specific areas such as Glengarnock,hit by 
steel closures,and Clydebank.
The essential feature of the Task Force approach was that it 
represented a joint venture, involving the integrated efforts of the
and
SDA, local authority and the private sector (4or example BSC in 
Glengarnock). Within this the responsibility for policy and 
coordination was allocated to the SDA, thereby it was argued 
providing a quicker process of decision making and project implementation. 
In order to avoid some of the weaknesses experienced in GEAR, it was 
felt necessary to give the Task Force a presence in the area concerned 
and provide it with sufficient autonomy to resist external interference 
on its actions. Within the SDA itself the overall policy making body
of the Task Forces is the Special Development Division which also 
serves to coordinate the various other Agency functions in these areas.
Unlike GEAR the SDA Task Forces have operated with some degree
olocL
of success through the promotion of new ventures/ management services,
etc. Similarly, they have not experienced the same levels of opposition 
doe
as GEAR, this is/in part * to their 'non-permanent1 nature with the 
Task Force dissolving once specified thresholds and targets are achieved. 
But perhaps of most importance is the fact that Task Forces represent 
an attempt by the Agency to evolve new activities in response to new 
sets of problems.
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6.6 Conclusions
From the evidence it would appear that the Scottish Development 
Agency represents less of an innovation than might seem at first 
sight. True, it embodied the logic of incorporating within a single 
authority the variety of functions necessary to promote regional 
development (though it was given no direct power in relation to the 
provision of infrastructure). Yet its ability to utilise these 
functions in an integrated and creative way has been limited.
A significant proportion of the SDA's activity was absorbed 
from pre-existing organisations such as the Scottish Industrial 
Estates Corporation and the Derelict Land Unit at the Scottish Office. 
Yet the essentially 'allocative' manner by which these functions were 
previously discharged (as part of the formal government machine) has 
scarcely changed. This has meant that much of the SDA's energies 
have been devoted to providing what is essentially a service. This 
is not what the development agency idea is about.
The only really new elements of the SDA were its industrial 
investment and its strategic planning functions. By incorporating 
these new activities within an institutional arrangement outside the 
existing machinery of government (with its bureaucratic constraints 
and day to day scrutiny) a more innovative approach towards tackling 
the severe and distinctive problems of Scotland would be possible. Yet, 
in its exercise of these new powers the SDA has, despite all its 
apparent 'advantages', been unable to escape the allocative pressures 
of government.
Given its fundamental lack of operational freedom and the present 
economic climate it is difficult to see how the SDA will be able to 
generate the actions, drive and imagination necessary to do itself out 
of business and thereby successfully fulfil its role as a development 
agency for Scotland.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
If the problems of the region are to be confronted some new 
form of institution capable of transcending the sectional interests 
of local authorities and the functionally canalised concerns of 
central government departments is necessary. In chapter 1 some 
of the institutional formulae for achieving this were suggested. 
However, of those which have been established in Britain the majority 
have been afforded a limited capability, with the real power for 
public action remaining concentrated in the organs of central and 
local government. The major exception to this condition of 
institutional impotency at the region has been the ad hoc regional 
development agencies such as the Highlands and Islands Development 
Board and the Scottish Development Agency.
Implicit in the creation of these new agencies was a recognition 
of the need to move away from the day to day political and bureaucratic 
constraints of existing authorities; which have evolved primarily to 
deliver a service rather than as planning and development agencies.
It can be argued that even if new sets of powers and finance were 
given to the existing institutions, (as suggested by the Wheatley 
Commission (197*0 » which called for a greater strategic and economic 
planning role for the local authorities (Mowat, 1980)), they could not 
carry out the task as well as special purpose regional development 
agencies. Therefore, in order to overcome the limitations of the 
traditional system of administration, the new agencies would not only 
require a significant and wide range of powers and a budget to help 
give expression to them,but also sufficient freedom and autonomy in 
the initiation of their functions.
These features of the development agency model ensures that it 
is an institutional formula to which regional planners are favourably 
disposed. It is also a device which in recent years has gained a fair
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degree of political acceptance (Alden and Morgan, 197*0 • Yet 
despite this it is an arrangement which on the evidence available 
from practice has fallen well short of theoretical expectations, 
and which has failed to significantly affect the course of the 
regional problem. This may be explained in part by three main 
sets of reasons —  the problems inherent in the development agency 
concept; the way in which it has been applied in Britain; and 
the environment within which* the development agencies have to work-.
Some Conceptual Problems
It has been argued that the creation of regional development 
agencies represents an.attempt to introduce at the level of the 
region a new and more powerful form of planning i.e. innovative 
planning (see chapter J>). Although this carries for development 
agencies a number of advantages in terms of their ability to come 
to grips with serious problems and conditions of crisis at the 
region, it also creates for them a number of problems which are 
inherent in this style of planning.
The fundamental requirement of innovative planning for 
institutional autonomy and independence means that it represents 
a potentially undemocratic solution to the problems it is designed 
to confront. This may create for the regional development agency 
serious problems concerning its relationship with the people it is 
designed to serve who may feel they have little or no say in its 
operation, and with government who may wish to act as a check on; 
and thereby come into conflict withythe agency. As a result, the 
regional development agency is an institutional device which if fully 
applied can never satisfy those who wish to see direct accountability 
at every level of government.
Another problem which follows on from the previous point is
that the innovative agency may establish a commitment to a particular
course of action which becomes ingrained in its organisation and
ttercfbre
given the administrative autonomy of the agency is^preserved from challenge. 
In this way the development agency may lose its contact with and 
sensitivity to the initial problem it was set up to confront.
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Although innovative planning and its embodi ment in the 
development agency idea may appear to represent a radical change 
in govteffWYienV administration. it may act as a substitute for, and 
thereby serve to delay, more fundamental reforms within the 
administrative framework. In other words, the problem may lie in 
the poor structure and performance of the main established 
institutions and that new institutions may simply serve to cover up 
this fundamental weakness.
Problems Emerging from Practice
In their application within Britcun. . regional
development agencies have been severely constrained by their need 
to work with and through existing bodies in their environment.
For example, the Scottish Development Agency in the fulfilment of 
its land renewal function must operate with and secure the support 
of local authorities upon whom it relies for the submission and 
implementation of schemes. As a result, the SDA becomes restricted 
to pursuing those projects which have the acceptance of the local 
authorities. This may incline the planning process towards the 
development of actions emerging out of consensus and bargaining, 
which may serve to constrain the agency’s fulfilment of its role as 
a regional development agency.
Similarly, development agencies have been used to supplement 
rather than completely replace other central government functions and 
activities in their areas. This, together with their demands for 
operational independence, may pose severe relational problems. This 
point is illustrated by the activities of both the Scottish Development 
Agency and the Scottish Economic Planning Department with regard to 
inward investment in Scotland. Although the SDA may find the investor 
and bring them in the negotiation of the financial package remains 
largely the concern of SEPD - a government department within the Scottish 
Office. This kind of dependence on other agencies, each with their own 
operational procedures and criteria for judging schemes etc., imposes 
severe constraints on the SDA exploiting its own flexibility as an 
innovative agent of development.
7*+
In practice, therefore, it has proved difficult for regional 
development agencies to provide the necessary element of coordination 
between schemes at the strategic level of the region, and to create 
among the various agencies involved with regional development a 
commitment to their operations. Thus there is the tendency
for development agencies to operate in those areas where external 
dependancies and interference is minimised at the expense of tackling 
the fundamental problems.
Within the agencies themselves there is the problem of how to 
fulfil the miscellany of broadly stated objectives, some parts of 
which may prove to be contradictory. For example, at its inception 
the purposes of the SDA included the safeguarding of employment as well 
as the promotion of industrial efficiency and international competitiveness 
(SDA Act, 1975)• These potentially conflicting purposes have since 
been resolved through revised operational Guidelines (SEPD, 1980) 
which state that industrial efficiency should prevail in the long term 
interest of building up a soundly based industrial structure.
Nevertheless, a number of other contradictions remain embodied within 
the Agency's organisation. This is an inevitable problem facing 
multi-purpose agencies.
Perhaps the major constraint on the operations of regional 
development agencies in Britain results from their creation in a 
form which demands a high degree of accountability to central 
government. In particular, they are dependent on central government 
for their funding. In this way government, is able to apply a wide 
degree of control over the agencies expenditure and on the exercise of 
their functions. For example, the rigid requirement of profitability 
imposed upon SDA investments (SEPD, I98O) -limits the extent to which 
it is able to act as an agent of regional development rather than as a 
merchant bank. As the former Chief Executive of the SDA, Lewis Robertson, 
notes:
"There is no development agency in the world which 
doesn't proceed on the basis of aiding a considerable 
number of projects, some of which will fail. It has to 
be accepted that a proportion of failures is what a 
development agency is all about."
(Glasgow Herald, 23 January, 1981)
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This illustrates the fundamental problem facing the development 
agency in Britain of how to act dynamically and yet do so within 
the limits of what government considers acceptable.
A variety of ways of overcoming this dependence on central 
government have been proposed for the Scottish agencies i.e. the 
HIDB and the SDA, including the use of North Sea oil revenues to 
finance their operations and the 'earmarking1 of funds like 
the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno in Italy. There are some good 
arguments in favour of this apart from the nationalist arguments of 
reducing Scotland's dependence on England. It could ensure, for 
example, the channelling of the product of a free resource i.e.
North Sea oil,into productive investment rather than defense or 
wherever else the government might wish to divert the proceeds.
This principle has been followed up in other countries such as Chile, 
where the product of its copper taxation is channelled into the 
Corporation de Fomento de la Produccion (CCERFO) a development bank, 
and in Kuwait where a good deal of its oil revenue is directed into 
finance agencies and banks.
However, it would appear that the Treasury has a pathological 
aversion to this kind of earmarking, where it is contended that once 
the precedent has been set whisky drinkers will start insisting that 
all excise duty be spent solely on pubs, and motorists will demand that 
all motor taxation goes towards roads etc. Furthermore, it would
appear unlikely that central government would wish to surrender to 
regional development agencies any real degree of control over areas 
of policy concerned with regional development, such as the directing 
of industrial, commercial and infrastructure investments, which are 
arguably among "the most powerful tools available to governments in 
their efforts to control, regulate or transform urban society."
(McKay and Cox, 1979? P- 20). It may be feared by governments that 
these powerful institutions might put regional considerations ahead 
of national priorities. This is because development agencies have 
tended to identify with regional interests and have built up a 
political following among certain sections of the population. Only 
political criteria are able to resolve this complex issue.
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Broader Considerations
It has been argued that development agencies in Britain carry 
with them problems inherent in their organisation as well as a 
number of problems particular to each. In addition to this the 
adverse conditions within which they have been set to work imposes 
severe restrictions on their operation. In particular, the effects 
of rapid national economic change and the world recession on 
vulnerable regions such as Scotland (regions being 'open economies') 
have served to undermine most of the actions taken by development 
agencies. To this end the solutions to regional problems may lie. 
beyond the scope of regional institutions no matter how powerful 
they may be.
The long standing failure of attempts to reverse the trends
also
of regional decline may/owe more to our inability to facilitate 
control over the complex dynamics of urban and regional processes, 
than to our failure to fully implement particular institutional and 
methodological solutions.
Final Comments
The significance of the development agency idea lies in the fact 
that many problems may develop in a national space which fail to fit 
the established institutional structure of society. In such cases 
new institutions may be required in order to adequately confront these 
problems. Despite this the regional development agency is an 
institutional device which suffers certain disadvantages,in particular 
its potentially undemocratic nature and its often tentative relationship 
with the people it is designed to serve and with other agencies in its 
environment. Given these problems there is a clear need to determine 
when it is an appropriate institutional solution.
The development agency should only be resorted to where there is a 
marked discrepancy between an area's actual and potential level of 
development, and where its sphere'of operation can be clearly separated 
from those of established agencies (Alden and Morgan, 197^0 • This may 
point the need toward more specialised agencies with powers skewed 
accordingly. It has also been suggested that the development agency
77
idea is only likely to be implemented anyway where it touches deeply 
felt regional or national sentiments (Grieve, 1973)* This has 
implications for the possible extension of the development agency 
idea to areas such as the north-east of England (see Guardian,
6 December, 1980), Economic arguments alone may be insufficient
grounds for such an agency. In those areas where it has been 
resorted to it may be necessary to accept some of its weaknesses as 
the inevitable price to be paid for the solutions to the
problems which it confronts.
There is a need for more academic, professional and popular 
discussion on the alternative means of institutionalising regional 
decision making. If institution building is to progress then it 
should have a clear consideration for the objectives of the exercise 
in terms of defining ends rather than just institutional means.
No amount of institution building and re-building can substitute 
for policy. Good administration will depend on good policy formulation 
and close links between the two. Unless the debate derives from such 
a perspective it is likely to become bogged down in hollow discussion 
about structures.
(approx. 26,000 words)
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